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Information is one of the most valuable commodities in business, as the products
of many companies today are simply bits of information. The business models of
these companies require explosive amounts of data collection and storage. Useful
information must be extracted from these vast amounts of data, and methods for
transmitting the data in a manageable way need to be developed. In this dissertation,
we propose methods for information delivery and procurement in order to address
these important issues.
In this introduction, we describe three problems arising from uncertainty in infor-
mation delivery and procurement systems. Specifically, we describe one problem in
network routing and two problems in prediction markets. We outline the contribu-
tions of this dissertation, addressing each problem through the design and analysis
of robust algorithms and protocols that account for uncertainty.
• Problem 1: Finding optimal routing polices in data networks that ac-
count for router based active congestion control. Most tra!c on current
backbone networks is transmitted, end-to-end, using Transmission Control Pro-
tocol (TCP). TCP inherently incorporates congestion control by resending lost
packets from the sender to the receiver. Due to its inherent congestion control
1
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methods, TCP is too slow to accommodate services such as Internet Protocol
telephony, Internet Protocol television, and Instant Messaging, all growing in
popularity. Such services use protocols like the User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
that do not have built-in congestion control. In order to manage throughput
across a network, congestion control must come from network components such
as the routers. Classically, router based congestion control has been addressed
by the Random Early Drop (RED) [34] algorithm. However, such routing pro-
tocols do not account for both routing and congestion control at the same time,
severely limiting the network throughput. We propose a mathematical model
to generate improved routing policies, while also taking into account congestion
control. The proposed model is not only easily extended to incorporate RED,
but can also take into account demand uncertainty when generating routing
policies. According to our computational experiments, the resulting polices are
at least 20% better than those currently used in a real world network [2].
• Problem 2: Analyzing and alleviating the impact of non-myopic actions
of risk neutral traders in prediction markets. Prediction markets are an
information aggregation tool in which participants trade on the outcome of a
future event. Some forms of subsidized prediction markets have been proven
to accurately aggregate traders’ beliefs [42, 63]. Subsidized prediction markets
have grown in popularity, and a number of Fortune 500 companies are using
them to aid in decision making [24]. When introduced, subsidized prediction
markets were only proven to accurately aggregate the beliefs of risk neutral
traders that do not take into account future payo"s, i.e., are myopic. However,
we show that if traders are allowed to take into account future payo"s and have
complementary information (meaning that a trader can earn a greater profit
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from knowing the other traders’ private information in addition to her own), the
incentive to not fully reveal information exists. We design a prediction market
that adjusts non-myopic traders’ incentives, leading to all traders revealing their
true beliefs.
• Problem 3: Analyzing and alleviating the impact of risk averse traders
in prediction markets. In practice people are not risk neutral, but tend to be
risk averse. Therefore, accurately aggregating the beliefs of risk averse traders
is key to creating practical prediction markets. We show that current prediction
market mechanisms do not accurately aggregate the beliefs of risk averse traders,
and propose one prediction market mechanism that does. Unfortunately, the
reward distributed by this mechanism decreases exponentially with the number
of traders. We prove that this exponential decrease is unavoidable by showing
that for any subsidized prediction market mechanism to aggregate the beliefs of
risk averse traders, it must exponentially decrease trader rewards.
1.1 Contributions
The contributions of this dissertation are:
Problem 1: Finding routing policies that maximize the amount of information received at
destinations subject to a standard active congestion control method. For the
network routing problem, we propose an optimization model that incorporates
active congestion control in a multi-commodity network. We show that in gen-
eral the problem is NP-hard. However, using a robust instance of the problem,
we show that a routing policy generated by applying a standard nonlinear pro-
gramming optimization software to the robust instance outperforms the routing
polices currently used in a real world network.
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Problem 2: What happens when traders in a prediction market take into account future
payo"s? For this problem, we show that when traders have complementary
information, they have an incentive to blu", meaning that they will not fully
reveal their information when they trade in a market with an unlimited number
of trades. We then propose a new prediction market to curb these incentives,
resulting in traders fully revealing their information as the number of trades
increases.
Problem 3: What happens when traders are risk averse? In studying this problem, we first
characterize the desired properties all subsidized prediction market mechanisms
should satisfy. Second, we observe that the reward distributed to traders with
arbitrary risk averse preferences must be non-negative (this is not the case
for current subsidized prediction market mechanisms). Third, we propose a
prediction market mechanism that satisfies the desired properties. However,
this mechanism exponentially reduces the rewards distributed to traders as the
number of traders increases. Finally, we show that for any prediction market
to satisfy the desired properties in the presence of traders with arbitrary risk
averse preferences, the reward must decrease exponentially with the number of
traders.
1.2 Outline of the Dissertation
In Chapter II, joint work with Marina Epelman and Dushyant Sharma, we de-
scribe the routing model used to generate routing polices while taking into account
current active congestion control methods, and apply the model to the Abilene net-
work. Further, we show that a routing policy that takes into account natural demand
fluctuation performs better than the currently deployed routing policies. In Chap-
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ter III we introduce prediction markets, some of the related work, and mention the
overlap that exists between Chapters IV and V. In Chapter IV, joint work with
Rahul Sami, we show that under certain information settings, prediction markets
using the log market scoring rule do not reach a market equilibrium because traders
blu", i.e., never fully reveal their true beliefs. In order to address the issue of blu"-
ing, we propose a discounted log market scoring rule and show that this market
converges to the truthful prediction at an exponential rate as the number of trades
in the market increases. In Chapter V, joint work with Marina Epelman and Rahul
Sami, we present a summary of desirable properties of subsidized prediction market
mechanisms, and propose a mechanism that possesses these properties even when
risk averse players are present. In the same chapter we show that all prediction
markets that satisfy the desirable properties must exponentially decrease the reward
distributed to players as the number of players increases. In Chapter VI, we leave
the reader with concluding remarks and future work.
The work presented in this dissertation is based on joint work with coauthors
indicated above. As such, each chapter is intended to be a self contained exploration
of the problem addressed. This means that the notation may di"er across chapters
and there is some overlap across introductory sections. In particular, Chapter III
introduces prediction markets, discusses some related work, and introduces some of
the notation used in Chapters IV and V. However, Chapters IV and V address
two di"erent problems in prediction markets. Therefore, the introductions of Chap-
ters IV and V do refer to some of the same background material, and the notation
introduced in Chapter III is modified in the subsequent chapters to appropriately
present the results discussed in each of the chapters.
CHAPTER II
New Models of Network Routing under Active Congestion
Control
This chapter is based on joint work with Marina Epelman and Dushyant Sharma.
This work is submitted for publication at the time of this writing.
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we consider network routing under congestion control. We focus
on active congestion control. We say that a congestion control method is active if
the amount of flow sent into a network component, such as an arc, is a function of
the network status; for example, in computer networks, some routers are designed
for congestion control and as information is passed through the routers some packets
may be dropped. (Contrast this with a congestion control method that preserves the
amount of flow on every component of the network; for instance, a road network, in
which cars travel slower on a congested highway, but remain in the network until they
reach their destinations.) Though the proposed model and techniques easily extend
to most networks with congestion control, we focus on computer networks with active
congestion control. In the remainder of this section we first present background
required to understand the current routing policies and congestion control techniques
used in computer networks, and then describe the question we address in this chapter.
6
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In Section 2.2 we present our mathematical model for determining routing policies
in a network with a particular type of congestion control and show, in Section 2.3,
that it is NP-hard. In Section 2.4 we present a real world computer network, and
discuss the performance of di"erent routing policies generated using locally optimal
solutions of the model in Section 2.5. Finally, in Section 2.6 we propose a robust
formulation of the model and present its performance relative to the routing policy
currently used.
2.1.1 Model Idea
We design a routing policy in a computer network using a generalization of a
multi-commodity network flow model described, for instance, by Ahuja et al. [4].
In our model, every origin and destination (OD) pair in the network constitute a
commodity, and every commodity has a fixed amount of demand that is sent from
the origin node to the destination node. The main di"erence from the generalized
multi-commodity network flow model, as we discuss later, is that the amount of flow
of each commodity received at the head of an arc is a function of the total flow on
that arc. After introducing some background, we will revisit the model and explain
it, and its relation to previous work, in greater detail.
2.1.2 Computer Network Background
In this section we discuss some of the current network protocols used in computer
networks and point out which ones will be captured by the proposed mathematical
model. In a telecommunications network, one has to make two decisions: one is what
path(s) the information is going use from the source to the destination, using a rout-
ing protocol, and the other is what type of flow management will be used to improve
quality of service in the network, using a network end-to-end protocol. In particular,
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we will describe Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) and Multiprotocol Label Switch-
ing (MPLS) routing protocols, and the implications of each one for finding routing
policies used in the network. We will then describe Random Early Detection (RED),
an active congestion control method currently available in computer networks, and
the implications of taking RED into account when generating an optimal routing
policy.
As a notational issue, it is important to note that computer networks transmit
information in packets, or discrete blocks of information. However, in a network flow
model each commodity is thought to be continuous and as such we can think of each
commodity’s flow in the proposed model as the rate of packets for that commodity
in the computer network.
Network Protocols
Computer networks tend to use a variant of one of two end-to-end transmission
protocols. One is the transmission control protocol (TCP) and the other is the user
datagram protocol (UDP).
A packet sent using TCP is acknowledged by the receiver and, if a sender does not
receive the acknowledgment in a given timeframe, the packet is re-sent after waiting
an exponentially increasing amount of time. As one would expect, TCP inherently
slows down the throughput due to the constant acknowledgments that are sent back
to the senders. A network using TCP, by definition of the protocol, has built-in
active congestion control in that it modifies the transmission rate, i.e., the e"ective
demand of each commodity, in response to congestion in the network.
UDP is a protocol commonly used to transmit Voice Over Internet Protocol
(VoIP), Internet Protocol Television (IPTV), and Instant Messaging (IM) services
tra!c. It does not have built-in acknowledgment for every received packet, and all
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packets are sent once, with no guarantee of being received. If UDP is used without
any congestion control, severe congestion could occur in the network. Moreover, a
network using UDP without congestion control is susceptible to a denial of service
attack during which an attacker floods the network with UDP packets. With the
growing prominence of VoIP, IPTV and IM tra!c on the Internet, examining the
impact of active congestion control on computer networks with UDP tra!c is of
interest.
Routing Protocols
Open Shortest Path First (OSPF)
The Open Shortest Path First routing protocol, OSPF, was first proposed in 1989
and has been modified four times since the original request for comments (RFC)
was posted. The RFC for the current version of OSPF was posted in April of 1998
[61]. OSPF is a routing policy used in intranet networks, i.e. Autonomous Systems,
which are networks administered by a single organization. Abstractly OSPF can be
described as routing demand along a single path for every origin and destination (OD)
pair in the network, namely, the shortest path between those origin and destination
nodes. As a rule of thumb, Cisco Systems recommends the arc weights used in the
shortest path calculation to be set to the inverse of the arc capacities [70]. In practice,
since arc capacities seldomly change, the paths between nodes are updated rather
infrequently. As most networks, specifically the ones we examine in Section 2.4,
are still using OSPF, we will use network performance under OSPF routing as a
benchmark for assessing network performance under Multiprotocol Label Switching,
which we will describe next.
Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS)
Multiprotocol Label Switching, MPLS, was proposed in January of 2001 [55].
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MPLS di"ers from OSPF in that each OD pair in the network has multiple paths,
which may or may not be disjoint, simultaneously able to carry positive flow from
the origin to the destination.
When a packet first enters the network, the incoming router looks at the desti-
nation of the packet and chooses which of the possible paths it should follow to its
destination. It then assigns the appropriate label to the packet and forwards it to
the first node in the determined path.
Associated with each intermediate router in the network is an MPLS routing table.
Each row of the table contains information that determines, given the neighbor the
packet came from and its current label, the next node on the packet’s path to its
destination, and a new label to attach to the packet (the new label can be interpreted
by the next router in the same manner). Once a packet is received by a router, the
router removes the current label of the packet, identifies the appropriate row of its
MPLS table, and attaches a new label and forwards the packet accordingly.
The proposed research is to find a routing policy which is feasible in a network
using MPLS while accounting for both active congestion control and demand un-
certainty. Though currently OSPF is used in intranet networks, most networks are
beginning to port to MPLS. Therefore, now is the time to address the issue of find-
ing good MPLS routing policies for networks facing congestion control and demand
uncertainty.
Random Early Detection (RED)
In a computer network, whenever a packet, or a datagram of information, is for-
warded from one router to another, that packet must be examined by the forwarding
router. If two or more packets need to be examined, then all packets not being ex-
amined are placed in a queue of finite capacity, say u, and serviced in a first in first
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out (FIFO) manner. However, if the rate of incoming packets is greater than the
router service rate, the queue will reach capacity u and no incoming packets will be
enqueued. To address the issue of the resulting starvation, the Random Early Detec-
tion, RED, congestion avoidance mechanism was introduced [34]. The mechanism
separates the router queue capacity into three regions, characterized by parameters
0 ! ! ! " ! u. In the first region, between an empty queue and a queue length
of !, all incoming packets are enqueued to wait for service. In the second region,
with queue length between ! and ", the probability that a packet is enqueued is
determined by a decreasing linear function with a slope of "#, for # > 0. Finally, in
the third region, with queue length between " and u, none of the incoming packets
are enqueued into the router queue. Since " determines the e"ective capacity of the
queue, without loss of generality we will let " = u for the remainder of this chapter.
2.1.3 Gain Functions
Though our work is motivated by an application to computer network routing,
the nominal problem being addressed is an extension of the generalized network flow
problem, as described by Ahuja et al. [4, Chapter 15]. In a single commodity setting,
we denote by xij the amount of flow sent from node i to node j on arc (i, j) and by
yij the amount of flow received at node j from node i on arc (i, j). In the classic
network flow model we would have yij = xij. In a generalized flow setting, however,
we have yij = xijµij, where µij > 0 represents the proportional loss or gain of flow on
arc (i, j). In a network with congestion control imposed by the RED algorithm, we
have yij = xijfij(xij). In this setting fij(xij) represents the loss, due to congestion
at router at node i, that takes place on arc (i, j). Since fij(xij) is a function of xij,
this new model is a further generalization of the generalized network flow model.
As noted in Section 2.1.2, we can define a function g(t), the probability of a packet
12





1 0 ! t ! !,
1" #(t" !) ! ! t ! u,
0 u ! t.
We chose # = 1u!! to guarantee continuity of g(·). Note also that with this choice
of # the e"ective capacity of the arc is u, as desired. As defined, g(t) determines the
loss on an arc as a function of yij, because every enqueued packed will be serviced.
Therefore, the f(t) function satisfies f(t) = g(tf(t)). When g(t) is defined as above,
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"(1+"t) ! < t,
and with # as above, h(t)# u as t#$, ensuring that the capacity is not exceeded.
Observe also that h(t) is non-decreasing and concave.
In a multi-commodity setting that we will consider in this chapter, the flow con-








for each arc (i, j) and each com-
modity k.
Shigeno [69] studied the problem of finding optimal routing polices for a single
commodity using congestion control. He refers to the function f(t) above as a gain
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function, and defines a concave gain function to be a gain function f(t) such that
h(t) = tf(t) is concave and non-decreasing. Note that the RED congestion function
f(t) given by (2.1) is less than or equal to 1 for all t, and thus represents a loss of
flow on an arc. However, to stay consistent with Shigeno we refer to f(t) as a gain
function.
2.1.4 Proposed Problem
In this chapter we propose a mathematical model for Internet routing under active
congestion control. We propose a continuous flow model (rather than a packet burst
model) that is motivated by computer networks using UDP with RED deployed in
the network. Though the proposed model is NP-hard, we show that routing policies
obtained by applying a nonlinear programming solver to the model improve network
performance over existing routing policies for a computer network.
2.1.5 Previous Research
Shigeno [69] introduced the concept of a concave gain function, and associated
a concave gain function with every arc in a network. He showed that in a single
commodity network flow problem with concave gains, a routing policy maximizing
the total flow received at the destination node can be found in polynomial time. As
our problem is a multi-commodity flow problem with concave gains, it helps to think
of the proposed problem as the multi-commodity flow generalization of Shigeno’s
work.
Several studies besides Shigeno have looked at generating routing policies in net-
works while taking into account congestion. For example, She! [67] addresses the
issue of roadway congestion in optimal tra!c selection. In his models he proposes a
convex function representing the travel time on a roadway (i.e. an arc of a network).
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As the number of users of a roadway segment increases, so does their travel time on
that segment, until the capacity of the roadway is reached. The users of the roadway
are assumed to minimize their total travel time. This model is similar to the one
of interest; however, all passengers on a roadway remain on a roadway, while in our
model we can remove users. Studies addressing demand uncertainty using a robust
routing scheme will be discussed in detail in Section 2.6.
2.2 Multi-Commodity Network Flow Problem with Nonlinear Gains
We begin by defining the Multi-Commodity Network Flow problem with Nonlinear
Gains (MCFPNG). Let G = (N, A) be a directed graph with node set N and arc
set A, and (ok, dk) % N &N for k = 1, . . . , K be origin-destination node pairs for K
commodities. We consider the arcs to have infinite capacity, and let fa : R+ # R+
for a % A be gain functions associated with each of the arcs. Let sk be the supply
of commodity k originating at its origin ok, and ck be the value per unit of this
commodity delivered to destination dk. We will use the following notation:
• xki ' amount of flow of commodity k present at node i % N ;
• #kij ' the fraction of commodity k present at node i sent to node j, on arc
(i, j) % A;
• $+(v) and $!(v) denote the sets of nodes in N that are end points of arcs coming
out of node v and coming into node v, respectively.
There are several possible ways of defining the MCFPNG; our version is, essentially,
a weighted maximum flow problem with multiple commodities and (nonlinear) gain
functions on each arc.
15






s.t. xkok = s
k k = 1, . . . , K(2.3)
(
(i,j)"A
#kij = 1 k = 1, . . . , K, i % N : i (= dk(2.4)
(
(i,j)"A














" xkj = 0 k = 1, . . . , K, j % N : j (= dk(2.6)
#kij ) 0 (i, j) % A, k = 1, . . . , K.(2.7)
Here, the objective function (2.2) maximizes the weighted sum of flows of each com-
modity delivered to the destination nodes, while constraints (2.3) indicate the supply
of each commodity. Constraints (2.4) and (2.5), together with (2.7), ensure that the
entire amount of commodity k available at node i is routed along the edges emanating
from i, with the exception of the destination node for that commodity. Constraints
(2.6) calculate the amount of commodity k available at node j by tracking the flow
of that commodity routed, and lost, on each of the arcs coming into node j.
2.3 Complexity of MCNFCG
This section is dedicated to proving the following
Theorem II.1. MCFPNG is NP-hard.
The proof is done by reduction from the Set Cover problem:
Definition II.2. Set Cover in minimization form is defined as follows: given
• set U = {e1, e2, . . . , em} and
• collection of subsets Sj * U, j % {1, 2, . . . , n},
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find a minimum set cover, i.e.set J * {1, 2, . . . , n} such that +j"JSj = U , of minimum
cardinality.
Given a Set Cover instance, we construct the following directed graph G, as a 4
layer network:
Layer 1 consists of one node for every element, ei % U, i % {1, . . . ,m},
Layer 2 consists of one node for every subset, Sj, j % {1, . . . , n},
Layer 3 consists of one node, I,
Layer 4 consists of one node, t.
The layers are connected in the following manner:
• For every i and j such that ei % Sj there is a directed arc (ei, Sj),
• For every j there is a directed arc (Sj, I),
• There is a directed arc (I, t).
For example, consider the following instance of set cover:
U = {e1, e2, e3, e4, e5}
S1 = {e1, e2, e3}
S2 = {e1, e2, e3, e4}
S3 = {e1, e4}
S4 = {e1, e5}.
The corresponding directed graph constructed as described above is depicted in Fig-
ure 2.1.
To define an instance of MCFPNG, we define the following m + 1 commodities:
17
Figure 2.1: Example of graph construction
Commodity 0 from origin node I to destination node t, i.e.o0 = I and d0 = t, with
s0 = 1 and c0 = 1;
Commodity i, for i = 1, . . . ,m from origin node ei to destination node t, i.e.oi =
ei and di = t, with si = 1 and ci = 0.
Finally, the gain function of each arc is




1 t < 1
1
t 1 ! t
for all a % A, fitting the definition of a concave gain function. Though we can
consider the capacities of the arcs to be infinite, notice that the form of the gain
function f(t) above implies that the e"ective capacity of each arc is 1.
Note that the there were O(nm) steps required to transform the instance of set
cover into an instance of MCFPNG.
Given an instance of Set Cover, the corresponding MCFPNG instance resulting
18




s.t. x0I = 1(2.9)
xkek = 1 k = 1, . . . ,m(2.10)
(
(i,j)"A
#kij = 1 k = 0, . . . ,m, i % N : i (= dk(2.11)
(
(i,j)"A














" xkj = 0 k = 0, . . . ,m, j % N : j (= dk(2.13)
#kij ) 0 (i, j) % A, k = 0, . . . ,m.(2.14)
Below we explore some of the properties of optimal solutions to this problem. For




xiv, v % N,
i.e.Xv denotes the total amount of flow of commodities 1 through m present at node
v.
Proposition II.3. A feasible solution (#, x) of (2.8) – (2.14) is optimal if and only






For any feasible solution (#, x), #kIt = 1 ,k due to (2.11), as there is only one arc out
of I. In addition, x0I = s
0 = 1, and so XI +x0I ) 1, implying that f(XI +x0I) = 1XI+x0I .
Moreover, x0t = x
0
I · f(XI + x0I) = 11+XI . Therefore, as the objective of (2.8) is to
maximize x0t , a feasible solution is optimal if and only if it minimizes XI .
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Proposition II.4. There exists an optimal solution (#, x) which has integral values
(0 or 1) of variables # and x associated with all arcs from layer 1 to layer 2.
Proof. If in a feasible solution the values of # are integral (0 or 1) for all arcs from
layer 1 to layer 2, then, according to (2.11), this solution has positive flow on exactly
one arc (ei, Sj) for each i = 1, . . . ,m. Since the supply at each node ei is si = 1, the
amount routed on all arcs from layer 1 to layer 2 is 0 or 1. Thus, we only need to
show existence of a solution with integral values of # associated with all such arcs.
Let (#, x) be an optimal solution, and suppose that there is a node ei in layer 1
such that the # values at this node to layer 2 split commodity i between two or more
arcs. Without loss of generality, let the corresponding nodes in layer 2 be S1 and S2,
i.e.#ei,S1 > 0 and #ei,S2 > 0.
Recall that the total flow of commodities 1, . . . ,m present at node I is equal to
XI =
&n
j=1 XSjf(XSj), by construction of G. Without loss of generality, assume
XS1 ) XS2 .
Consider solution (#̃, x̃) that is obtained from solution (#, x) by moving the flow of







while all other # values at layer 1 nodes remains the same. It is easy to verify that







and thus, in view of Proposition II.3, (#̃, x̃) is optimal. In fact, it only needs to be
shown that
X̃S1f(X̃S1) + X̃S2,f(X̃S2) ! XS1f(XS1) + XS2f(XS2),
since the other values remain unchanged.
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Due to the supply constraint at node ei, xi#i(ei,S1) + x
i#i(ei,S2) = x
i#̃i(ei,S1) +


























Consider the following two cases:
Case 1: XS2 < 1. In this case XS2f(XS2) = X(S2,I) and X̃S2f(X̃S2) = X̃S2 = XS2 "
xiS2 . Furthermore, X̃S1f(X̃S1) = (XS1 + x
i
S2) · f(XS1 + x
i
S2). Notice that the
function f(t) satisfies
(t + #) f(t + #) ! t f(t) + # for all t ) 0 and # ) 0,
and so
X̃S1f(X̃S1) + X̃S2,f(X̃S2) = XS2 " xiS2 + (XS1 + x
i
S2) · f(XS1 + x
i
S2)
! XS2 " xiS2 + XS1f(XS1) + x
i
S2
= XS1f(XS1) + XS2f(XS2),
as desired.
Case 2: XS1 ) XS2 ) 1. Notice that in this case XS1f(XS1) + XS2f(XS2) = 2. In
the new solution, X̃(S1,I) ) X(S1,I) ) 1, and hence X̃S1f(X̃S1) = 1. On the other
hand, due to the form of the gain function, X̃S2f(X̃S2) ! 1, and hence the total
amount of commodities 1 though m arriving at node I will not increase.
Modifications above removed the flow on one of the arcs between layers 1 and 2
without loss of optimality. Applying this procedure repeatedly will generate an
optimal solution with positive flow on exactly one arc (ei, Sj) for each i = 1, . . . ,m.
Finally, notice that each step of the above modification procedure takes a constant
amount of time to execute, and needs to be applied at most mn times.
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The procedure outlined in the above proof can be applied to any feasible solution
(#, x), producing a feasible solution (#̃, x̃) with integral values on arcs from layer 1
to layer 2 and with the same or better objective function value in at most mn steps.
Proposition II.5. A feasible solution of (2.8) – (2.14) with integral flow (0 or 1)
on each arc from layer 1 to layer 2 is optimal if and only if it minimizes the total
number of arcs from layer 2 to layer 3 with nonzero flow.
Proof. In any feasible solution (#, x) with integral flow (0 or 1) on each arc from
layer 1 to layer 2, XSj =
&m
i=1 x






0 XSj = 0,









which, in view of Proposition II.3, implies the conclusions of the proposition.
Proposition II.6. Suppose (#, x) is an optimal solution of (2.8) – (2.14) with in-
tegral flow (0 or 1) on each arc from layer 1 to layer 2. Then the set J = {j :
X(Sj ,I) > 0} is an optimal solution to the corresponding instance of the minimum set
cover problem.
Proof. First notice that any feasible solution of MCFPNG (2.8) – (2.14) with integral
flow on each arc from layer 1 to layer 2 corresponds to a set cover J constructed as
follows: j % J if and only if #i(ei,Sj) = 1 for some ei, or equivalently, XSj > 0 (and








I(XSj > 0) = |J |.
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Conversely, every minimal set cover J (i.e., one that does not contain a set cover of
smaller cardinality) can be represented by a feasible solution of the corresponding
MCFPNG with integral flow on each arc from layer 1 to layer 2 as follows: For each
i = 1, . . . ,m, pick any j % J such that ei % Sj and set #i(ei,Sj) = 1, i.e. direct 1 unit
of flow along the arc (ei, Sj) (since J is a set cover, such j can always be found).
Assign flows on arcs out of layer 2 and layer 3 nodes accordingly to satisfy flow gain




I(XSj > 0) =
n(
j=1
XSjf(XSj) = XI .
Thus, by Proposition II.5, the minimum set cover can be obtained by finding an
optimal solution to MCNFNG (2.8) – (2.14) with integer flows on arcs from layer 1
to layer 2.
To complete the reduction, in view of Proposition II.6, one only needs to recall
that an arbitrary optimal solution to (2.8) – (2.14) can be modified in at most mn
steps into one with integral flows from layer 1 nodes to layer 2 nodes.
We have thus established that the MCFPNG as modeled by (2.2) – (2.7) is NP-
hard. Nonetheless, a nonlinear programming solver can be used to successfully find
locally optimal solutions to instances of the MCFPNG. It is important to note that
the complexity proof hinged on the fact all of the flow present at any non-destination
node must be sent, constraint (2.11), and that there were no self loops in the routing
of the commodities. If either of these two conditions were not satisfied then the




#kij ! 1, for k = 0, . . . ,m, i % N : i (= dk), then all of the commodities of
value zero in the construction would remain at their destinations leading to a trivial
solution. Similarly, if we had self-loops, all of the zero value commodities would be
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sent on the self loops e"ectively never interfering with commodity of value. The
remainder of the chapter is dedicated to numerical experiments with this model.
2.4 Abilene Network
As a testbed for numerical experiments in the following sections we used the
Abilene Network depicted in Figure 2.2. The Abilene Network is the backbone
network of the Internet2 community. The Internet2 community is a not for profit
consortium of universities, companies, and government agencies that develops and
deploys advanced network applications critical to the progress of the Internet. We
have obtained network usage data in the Abilene Network in the form of 24 weekly
data sets during a 6-month period of time in 2004 (March 1, 2004 to September 4,
2004) [1]. As the usage data does not span the entire 6-month period, we do not
present the data instances in absolute terms (e.g. 10 AM August 12), but instead
use relative terms (e.g. instance 2783). Due to the time the data was collected,
for the remainder of this chapter we discuss the Abilene Network as it existed in
2004, during which time OSPF was used to deliver tra!c between every origin and












Figure 2.2: The Abilene Network
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2.5 Numerical Experiments
In the remainder of the chapter we will present results of our numerical studies.
In this section, we first describe the specifics of how we applied our model to the
Abilene network, including a discussion of the objective function used, and present
the first set of numerical results.
The Abilene network usage data, provided at [1], consists of the demands between
every origin and destination pair in the 11-node network over five minute intervals.
It should be pointed out that the data collected consist of arc flows during the
specified period of time (e.g. 5 minutes). This arc flow data is then converted into
estimates of demand between every OD pair with a method such as the one discussed
by Roughan et al. [64]. The method used is not the topic of this chapter, but it is
important to note that the demand data provided at [1] is only an estimate of the
true demand.
For our numerical experiments we encoded the model (2.2) – (2.7) in AMPL [35],
and used the data captured from the Abilene Network to define a family of data files,
one for each time interval (we aggregated the data into hour-long intervals). We
used SNOPT [38], a nonlinear programming solver, to solve the resulting problem
instances. In preliminary experiments with MCFPNG models, we found SNOPT
to perform better than several other popular nonlinear solvers, possibly due to the
high level of nonlinearity of the constraints. SNOPT uses a sequential quadratic
programming algorithm to find locally optimal solutions, and has been successfully
used in solving nonlinear mathematical programs [32, 40]. We approximated the






Note that this gain function implies that every arc in the network has e"ective
capacity of 1. Correspondingly, we scaled the demand data provided at [1] by a
constant factor, in part so that no commodity had a demand greater than 1. (The
scaling factor is intended to calibrate the demands in the network to be consistent
with arcs having capacity of 1 unit, while maintaining the relative demand levels
between the OD pairs, and to be su!ciently high to justify deployment of congestion
control. Thus, the value of the scaling factor was arrived at, to some extent, by trial
and error. It is worthwhile pointing out that, after scaling, the overall level of demand
in the network, as compared to the capacity, is quite high. In particular, under
routing policies considered below, only a small fraction of some of the commodities
reaches the destination.)
2.5.1 Role of Objective Function
In (2.2) – (2.7) we presented the model with an objective function that maximizes






Alternatively, we may choose to maximize the weighted total fractions of commodi-









This objective function is appropriate in models motivated by the use of congestion
control in UDP networks, common in VoIP and IPTV applications, in which the
fraction of commodity delivered reflects the quality of service for that commodity.
Moreover, using objective (2.18) provides an incentive for commodities with smaller
demands to be routed to their destinations.
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Unfortunately, optimizing with respect to either one of these objective functions
may still lead to starvation, i.e.a situation in which some commodities are ignored
and not routed to their destination because of their lower relative values. This can be
circumvented, for instance, by adding constraints assuring a minimum performance
guarantee for all of the commodities. (For example, constraints can stipulate that at
least z% of every commodity must the received at the destination node.)
However, in a network with congestion control, imposing a minimum performance
guarantee could lead to an infeasible problem instance. An alternative approach
to avoiding starvation is to utilize a “max-min” objective function. For example,






Similarly, we can define the max-min modification of objective function (2.18). The
issue with either of these formulations is that the resulting routing policies may be
hindered by a commodity that simply has very little demand to begin with. An
optimal routing policy will optimize for the commodity with lowest demand and
may actually perform much worse, by any other metric, than one obtained with the
cumulative objective function approach.
In the numerical experiments discussed in this chapter, we used objective func-
tion (2.18), as our work is motivated by the use of congestion control in UDP net-
works. However, the above considerations should be taken into account, and alter-
native objective functions should be considered, when applying similar optimization




In the first set of numerical experiments, we considered the first week of usage
data (aggregated into hour-long increments). For each of the resulting 168 data
instances, we compared the performance of the current routing policy, OSPF, and
the MPLS routing policy optimized for that data instance, when each is subject to
congestion control. Recall that performance comparisons were done with respect to
the objective function in the form (2.18); we varied the weight coe!cients ck to arrive
at three di"erent sets of problem instances.
It should be pointed out that, since the feasible region of MCFPNG is not convex,
there might be multiple local, but not global, solutions to (2.2) – (2.7). Thus,
the routing policy found by the solver may not be truly optimal for the problem.
Moreover, which (local) optimum is found by the solver is dependent on the initial
routing policy used as a starting point of the optimization algorithm. We chose to
initialize the solver with the robust routing policy, discussed in Section 2.6, when
finding the proposed MPLS routing policy. The reasons for this choice will become
clear in the following section. In reporting our computational results, we nonetheless
refer to the solutions found by the solver as optimal, for simplicity of presentation.
In Figures 2.3–2.6, we compare the performance of the OSPF and MPLS routing
policies with three di"erent objective functions. The objective functions di"er by
having di"erent values of commodity weights, ck. As we do not have precise infor-
mation regarding the values of the commodities in the network we consider three
di"erent choices of the weights, to see if there is a performance change amongst the
resulting problem instances. The key takeaway from Figures 2.3–2.6 is that, regard-
less of the commodity weights used the MPLS routing policy, optimized for every
demand instance, performs better than the OSPF routing policy. Each objective
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function is the result of di"erent valuations of commodities in the network; to pro-
vide a framework for comparison between results reported in Figures 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5,
we note that node 1 (Sunnyvale) provides roughly 4% of the overall demand in the
network, while over 23% of the overall demand originates in node 10 (Washington,
DC). Note that the MPLS routing policy, when optimized for each demand instance,
performs much better than the OSPF routing policy in every instance and for every
objective function used. As shown in Figure 2.6, the improvement over the OSPF
routing policy is at least 27% when the objective function values all commodities
equally; similar improvements are obtained for other objective functions as well. To
summarize, a routing policy that (i) takes into account the actual demand, and (ii)
allows routing of each commodity on multiple paths performs much better than a

























































Figure 2.4: Commodities from node 10 are 5 times more valuable than all other commodities
2.6 Robust MPLS Routing Policies
In this section we present a robust reformulation of (2.2) – (2.7) and study em-
pirical performance of the resulting routing policy.
In Section 2.5.2 we compared the performance of the OSPF routing policy to the
MPLS routing policy that is optimized for every demand instance. As one would
expect, the latter outperformed the former in every instance. In practice, however,
demand in a network fluctuates continuously and is not known in advance; thus,
re-optimizing the routing policy for every short time period would not be feasible.
Therefore, in this section we will use ideas of robust optimization to propose a robust
counterpart of MCFPNG and find one MPLS routing policy which performs well for





























Figure 2.5: All commodities equal value
2.6.1 Robust Reformulation
Modern robust optimization was simultaneously introduced by Ben-Tal and Ne-
mirovski [73] and El Ghaoui et al. [37]. Robust optimization is a mathematical
programming modeling technique used when the problem data is not known exactly,
but instead it is known (or assumed) that any data instance from an uncertainty set
can be the problem data. The objective is to find a solution that is optimal among
the solutions feasible under all possible data realizations. Using this approach Ben-
Tal and Nermirovski [72] and El-Ghaoui and Lebret [36] pose and solve problems in
robust truss topology design and robust least-square optimization, respectively. Re-
cently robust optimization has attracted a lot of attention and has been considered
for portfolio selection problems [39], integer programming and network flow prob-

































Figure 2.6: All commodities are of equal value; fraction improvement
planning [25], etc.
Robust optimization and related approaches have also been applied to computer
routing and network flow problems [10, 11, 8, 68, 18]. For example, Applegate and
Cohn [8] look at minimizing the maximum link utilization over a set of feasible de-
mand realization in a network using MPLS. Chekuri [18] provides a survey paper of
the work to date on using robust optimization to create routing policies. Chekuri
characterizes the work of Applegate and Cohn as working on oblivious routing, mean-
ing that they design a routing policy that is used for a set of possible demand real-
izations without knowing the exact realization. The objective of an oblivious routing
policy, as described by Chekuri, is to minimize congestion. This is a valid objective
function to consider for a Virtual Private Network (VPN) setting, where there is a
strict limit on the amount of flow that can pass through any one point in the network.
The main distinguishing factor among works on oblivious routing is the structure of
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the uncertainty set, i.e.the set of possible demand realizations, considered. For ex-
ample, [8] considers a discrete set of demand realizations, while [11] is the first to
consider a polyhedral set of demand realizations.
As far as we know, none of the current work in oblivious routing takes into ac-
count active congestion control. Though minimizing congestion seems like a good
way to accomplish a level of congestion control, it may not capture the tradeo"s that
need to take place between di"erent commodities in the network. Moreover, since
active congestion control is accomplished, in part, through packet loss, it is not clear
whether the routing policies obtained from models that explicitly take active conges-
tion control into account will be the same as those obtained by simply minimizing
congestion without modeling congestion control.
A robust counterpart of the problem (2.2) – (2.7) takes into account multiple
demand instances (m % {1, . . . ,M}), and finds the routing policy maximizing the










s.t. xkok,m = s
k
m k = 1, . . . , K, m = 1, . . . ,M
(
(i,j)"A
#kij = 1 k = 1, . . . , K, i % N : i (= dk
(
(i,j)"A














" xkj,m = 0,
k = 1, . . . , K, j % N : j (= dk, m = 1, . . . ,M
#kij ) 0 (i, j) % A, k = 1, . . . , K.
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Here, skm is the demand for commodity k in data instance m, and x
k
i,m is amount of
flow of commodity k present at node i % N in instance m (note that the values of
#’s remain the same for all data instances, and thus specify a routing policy).
2.6.2 Numerical Results
Robust MPLS Routing policy: First Week
To formulate the robust counterpart of MCFPNG as given by (2.20), we need to
specify the uncertainty set, i.e.the collection of demand instances to be considered. In
considering the data for the Abilene network, we observed that the demand fluctuated
following, to a large extent, a daily pattern. Roughly speaking, demand during the
day was significantly higher than during early morning and night hours, which is
to be expected. (This pattern was less pronounced during the weekends, but was
still present.) Based on this observation, we constructed an uncertainty set with
three demand instances as follows. We considered the demand data for the first
week of usage, separated each of the 7 days into three eight-hour intervals (morning,
day, and night), and averaged the demand over these eight-hour intervals across
the week. Thus, the three demand instances included in the uncertainty set reflect
average hourly demand during mornings, days and nights during the first week of
usage.
The resulting robust problem (2.20) has M = 3, and can be solved using MINOS.
We then compared the performance of the resulting routing policy on the 168 demand
instances considered in section 2.5.2 (recall that each of these instances corresponds
to the demand during an hour-long interval during the first week). The results are
summarized in Figures 2.7– 2.10. In each plot of this figure, the robust MPLS routing
policy is the (possibly local) solution of the single problem (2.20), while OSPF and
optimal MPLS policies are the same as were found in section 2.5.2. In particular,
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each optimal MPLS routing policy has been optimized for the demand instance at
hand, and thus changes every hour.
As we mentioned in section 2.5.2, each optimal MPLS policy was obtained by
initializing the solver at the robust MPLS policy found by solving (2.20), thus as-
sessing the improvement to the robust policy that can be made by modifying it to
suit a particular demand instance. As demonstrated in Figures 2.7– 2.10, it appears
that fine-tuning the policy to a specific demand instance makes for very little im-
provement over the robust routing policy. In particular, Figure 2.10 compares, for
each data instance, the improvement over the OSPF routing policy realized by the
robust MPLS policy with the improvement over OSPF realized by the MPLS poli-
cies optimal for each instance. As expected, the improvement achieved by the robust
policy is never better, but the plots are fairly similar: the robust policy improves
performance by at least 27% in each instance, compared to the improvement of at
least 36% realized by the optimal policies.
To summarize, simply by taking into account the natural demand fluctuations
in a network, we propose a single, robust, MPLS routing policy which much better
performance than OSPF, and comparable performance with each of the optimal
MPLS policies.
Robust MPLS Routing policy: 24 Weeks
In Section 2.6.2 we proposed a robust MPLS routing policy, obtained by consid-
ering an uncertainty set considering of three data instances capturing morning, day
and night demand patters. Recall that we constructed these three instances by aver-
aging demands in the corresponding 8-hour periods during the first of the 24 weeks
of data available to us. Since at first glance the demand follows a weekly, as well as





























Figure 2.7: Commodities from node 1 are 5 times more valuable than all other commodities
would perform in the following weeks. This is the subject of this section. Here, we
limit our discussion to the case where all commodities are of equal value, but the
results discussed carry over to the other cases as well. At this point it is important
to note that 4 days of the 24 weekly datasets obtained overlap due to the way the
data was partitioned at the time it was collected. This means that for the plots in
Figures 2.11–2.14, 96 data instances (2.4% of all the instances) appear twice every
time a robust routing policy is evaluated.
The plot in Figure 2.11 presents the performance of the robust routing policy
obtained in Section 2.6.2 (based on week 1 data) relative to the performance of the
OSPF routing policy for each hour-long period in the 24-week period. This is done,
as before, by plotting the ratio of the objective function values of the robust policy
and the OSPF policy for each demand instance. If the ratio is greater than one, the































Figure 2.8: Commodities from node 10 are 5 times more valuable than all other commodities
for 86% of the instances.
A closer study of Figure 2.11 reveals that the robust policy based on week 1 data
performs better than the OSPF routing policy on all instances except for weeks 3, 4
and 5, which correspond to the period from March 15 until April 5 of 2004. Exam-
ining the data, we noted that these three weeks not only have the greatest demand
over all twenty-four weeks, but also have somewhat di"erent demand patterns than
week 1. For example, 35% of the total demand in week 4 originated from a node
that provided only 5% of the total demand in week 1. As the robust policy is catered
to the week 1 demand patterns, it is no surprise that it did not perform well when
the demand pattern was significantly di"erent. (Unfortunately, we were unable to
identify a cause or an explanation of such uncharacteristic demand patterns during
this time period.)


































Figure 2.9: All commodities equal value
basing it on week 4 data, and plotted its performance (relative to that of the OSPF
policy) in Figure 2.12. Notice that this robust policy performs well (i.e., better than
OSPF) only during weeks 3, 4 and 5, further confirming that this behavior is due
to the fact the demand pattern di"ers between these weeks and the rest of the time
period considered.
We still hypothesized that, aside from anomalous behavior in weeks 3, 4 and 5,
overall demand remains stable from week to week due to the self-similar nature of
demand patterns [27, 51]. Indeed, the first robust policy continued to perform well
in week 6 and beyond. We also looked at the performance of the robust routing
policy based on week 12 data in Figure 2.13. This policy performs better than the
other two routing policies, and seems to perform at least as well as the OSFP routing
policy on most of the data instances. There is still, however, a drop in performance




























































Figure 2.10: All commodities equal value, fraction improvements
Finally, Figure 2.14 shows that the objective function values of the robust rout-
ing policy based on week 12 data and the OSPF policy over time follow the same
trend, suggesting that, if the ratio of the objectives is greater than one, it is due
to the improvement achieved by the robust policy over OSPF, not deterioration of
OSPF performance (the same is observed with the other robust routing policies).
Figure 2.14 also suggests that a sharp reduction in the performance of a currently
implemented robust policy could serve as an indication that the demand pattern is
changing and the robust routing policy needs to be reevaluated using more current
demand data.
2.7 Conclusion and Future Work
We introduced a way to model congestion control in networks facing congestion
via the multi-commodity network flow problem with nonlinear gains (MCFPNG),




























Relative performance of the robust routing policy based on week 1 data and the OSFP
policy
Abilene network and showed that a better routing policy can be developed by taking
into account demand fluctuations — either by designing optimal routing policies for
the demand at hand, or, when the above is not possible or desirable, designing robust
routing policies.
As presented, our results only give relative performance guarantees by showing
empirically that the robust routing polices relatively outperform the OSPF routing
policy currently used in the Abilene network. In the future we would like to give
absolute performance guarantees on any routing policy we generate by using an
approximation algorithm to solve our model.
As a further avenue of research, we would like to consider applications of our
model in other areas of network routing. For instance, a modified version our model
could be used to find the minimum power levels for wireless routers so as to meet



























Figure 2.12: Relative performance of the robust routing policy based on week 4 data and the OSFP
policy
problem such as: what is the minimum power need in a wireless network such that
no more than 5% of packets in the network are lost? We believe that we can extend























































































Figure 2.14: Left axis: Relative performance of the robust routing policy based on week 12 data
and the OSFP policy; Right axis: Objective function values of the two policies
CHAPTER III
Introduction to Prediction Markets
In this chapter we introduce prediction markets in greater detail, and present
some of the notation we will use in Chapters IV and V.
3.1 Prediction Markets Overview and Notation
A prediction market is an information aggregation tool used to elicit and aggregate
participants’ beliefs regarding the outcome of a future event. Prediction markets are
used to predict future political and social events in markets such as InTrade [47], Iowa
Electronic Market [46], and Hollywood Stock Exchange [45]. Prediction markets are
also used in corporate settings. For example, Microsoft used a prediction market
to determine if an internal product would meet its delivery date [53]. Through this
market, the director learned that the project was behind schedule. Best Buy is also
using prediction markets to assess the success of new products and ideas [31]. One
of their prediction markets accurately forecasted the sales of a new laptop service
package o"ered by the company.
Prediction markets can be unsubsidized or subsidized. The InTrade market is
an unsubsidized prediction market in which traders use real money to trade. The
Microsoft prediction market is a subsidized prediction market in which each trader
is initially endowed with $50. We will discuss why a corporation would be interested
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in subsidizing prediction markets later on in this chapter.
The prediction markets above aggregate participants’ beliefs by incentivizing them
to reveal their private beliefs about the event. For example, assume there are n
traders in the market and participant i has private information, si, pertaining to
the outcome of a future event %. For ease of exposition, we assume the future
event is binary, % = 1 or % = 0. An individual running a market contingent on %
is interested in eliciting the probability of % given all of the traders’ private beliefs,
P{%|s1, s2, . . . , sn}. Prior to any trades in the market, each trader i has a private be-
lief on %, denoted P{%|si}. With every trade, all traders may update their private be-
liefs based on trades previously executed in the market. Trader i, after observing all of
the first k trades, has a new updated private belief, P{%|r1, r2, . . . ri!1, si, ri+1, . . . rk},
that reflects her assessment of other traders’ private information and the executed
trades (rj is the trade of trader j).
In practice, traders in prediction markets trade securities whose ultimate value is
contingent on the outcome of future events. For example, if a trader buys a “Yes”
contract for a security contingent on %, then she stands to earn $1 if % = 1 (the event
occurs) and $0 if % = 0 (if the event does not occur). Therefore, assuming traders
are risk neutral, the current market price in real world markets is interpreted as the
market consensus on the event taking place [79].
Though every trader initially has her private belief P{%|si}, this belief, or any
subsequently updated belief after trading, may not be entirely revealed when trading
in a prediction market due to the trader’s risk preferences. If this situation arises,
then prediction markets may not be accurately aggregating all of the traders’ beliefs.
We will discuss this issue along with di"erent forms of prediction markets in the next
section.
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3.2 Types of Prediction Markets
Prediction markets can be either unsubsidized or subsidized. There are reasons
to use one over the other, such as using subsidized prediction markets to guarantee
market liquidity. On the other hand, an unsubsidized prediction market does not
require any subsidy for information to be aggregated. We discuss the di"erences in
greater detail below.
3.2.1 Unsubsidized Prediction Markets
Unsubsidized prediction markets are similar to financial markets where orders to
buy and sell securities are matched in a Continuous Double Auction (CDA). In a
CDA prediction market, an agent willing to sell a stock sets an ask price and an agent
willing to buy a stock sets a bid price. If the ask price is less than or equal to the bid
price, then the two orders are matched and the orders are cleared. In these markets
trade continues until no trader would like to trade. At this point, the market is said
to reach equilibrium and the market price is said to be the equilibrium market price.
However, “no-trade” theorems can be used to characterize such equilibria (assuming
traders are maximizing their utility from participating in the CDA) [41, 49, 54, 65,
74, 75] (see the survey paper by Sent [66] for a detailed overview).
To summarize these “no-trade” results, if all of the agents are rational and have
the same risk averse preferences, then an agent willing to trade is informing the
other traders that she has valuable information and will be making a profit at their
expense. Therefore, those trades would not be willing to trade. This means that a
trader cannot profit from gathering more information in the market. This may seem
like an artificial construct, as trade occurs daily in financial markets, but these results
have been show in laboratory experiments by Angrisani et al. [7]. In the laboratory
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experiment, the authors show that participants, with the same risk preferences, ini-
tially trade, but as the number of trading rounds increases, the participants approach
a no-trade situation.
Both theoretically and in the experiment by Angrisani et al. traders need to have
the same risk preferences for “no-trade” results to hold. In practice, traders have
heterogeneous risk preferences. Preference heterogeneity may explain why financial
markets have such a high volume of trade. As we will see in the next section, having
traders with di"erent risk preferences, within CDA prediction markets, does not
guarantee traders’ beliefs will be accurately aggregated.
CDA prediction markets also run into the issue of elicitation, i.e., traders may
not have an opportunity to reveal their information in the market. Consider the case
where only one trader is present in a CDA prediction market. Because this trader is
the only one present, there is no possibility for her to trade with anyone else in the
market. Therefore, any information this trader has is not captured by the market.
Risk Aversion
In CDA prediction markets, if more than one trader is present in the market, and
all are willing to trade, the reported beliefs on the contingent event might not be
their true beliefs. In fact, risk averse traders will report their risk neutral probability
estimates of the event, as discussed by Kadane and Winkler [48]. When a trader is
risk averse, her risk preference and belief become intertwined. For example, if a trader
has private belief of P{%|si} on %, and a utility function u(·), then, as described by
Nau [56], she would report P̂{%|si}, where P̂{%|si} - P{%|si}u#(%|si), with u#(%|si)
being her marginal utility if the event occurs conditional on her information si. The
risk neutral probability of a trader is the probability an observer would assign to the
trader’s beliefs given her trading behavior and assuming the trader were risk neutral.
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Further, it can be shown that even though price is converging in a market, the market
may only be converging to a consensus in risk neutral probabilities and not the true
probabilities [57]. This result has the implication that the revealed consensus in
a CDA prediction market is not the consensus that would be reached if all of the
traders traded according to their private beliefs, P{%|si}. If the reached consensus
is in terms of the risk neutral probabilities and the risk references are unknown, then
we cannot calculate the true probability from the risk neutral probabilities.
Pennock [62] o"ers a detailed exploration of the behavior of traders with di"erent
risk preferences in a CDA setting. He points out that, although traders are risk
averse, they will trade with respect to their true probabilities. This means that, if
the current market consensus is less than their true probability, a trader, regardless
of risk preferences, would have a positive demand for this security. However, the
risk preferences determine the extent of each trader’s demand. From this result it
follows that if the traders all have the same initial beliefs on the traded events, then
the market will converge to the truthful probability. He then goes on to characterize
the equilibrium of a market if all of the agents have constant absolute risk aversion
or generalized logarithmic utility. These results allow the market equilibrium to be
interpreted correctly by a decision maker.
Prediction markets are used for information aggregation in the corporate set-
ting [24]. Since CDA prediction markets may not be incentivizing trade due to the
“no-trade” theorems, and have issues with eliciting traders’ beliefs when there are
few of them trading, most corporate predictions markets are subsidized. In the next
section we review a few forms of subsidized prediction markets, and discuss in detail
market scoring rule prediction markets.
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3.2.2 Subsidized Prediction Markets
For someone interested in eliciting the beliefs of all participants in a prediction
market regardless of the number of traders present, a way to ensure this elicitation is
to subsidize the market via a market maker. In a prediction market using a market
maker, all traders e"ectively trade with the market maker so that market liquidity
is guaranteed. Subsidizing the market ensures that a no-trade situation does not
arise. However, if participants are risk averse, traders will still only report their risk
neutral probabilities.
A simple market maker is one that accepts all bid and ask o"ers in a CDA setting.
The issue with such an approach is that the amount of subsidies introduced into the
market may not be bounded.
Another market maker prediction market is the dynamic pari-mutuel market [63].
The dynamic pari-mutuel market is based on traditional pari-mutuel markets used
in horse racing, but allows for early sale at a dynamically changing price in order to
encourage early trade by informed traders. Standard pari-mutuel markets distribute
the winnings proportionally to the total wager of the winning horse. For example, if
Alice places $10 on the winning horse and Bob places $5 on the winning horse, then
Alice receives 23 of the total winnings and Bob receives
1
3 . In dynamic pari-mutuel
markets, the proportion of winnings is also dependent on when the bet was made;
in the example above, if Bob made the bet on the winning horse (the event that
occurred) before Alice then he would receive more than 13 of the total winnings.
A type of subsidized prediction markets is market scoring rule (MSR) prediction
markets, introduced by Hanson [42]. (Proper) Market scoring rules are derived from
(proper) scoring rules. The notion of scoring rules was introduced by Brier [16], in
the form of the quadratic scoring rule (which is proper), to measure the accuracy
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of weather forecasters. Proper scoring rules provide a way to reward or evaluate a
forecaster in a way that motivates honest probabilistic forecasts. Other proper scor-
ing rules, like the logarithmic scoring rule, were later introduced again to assess the
quality of weather reports [76, 77]. Most of the early work on scoring rules assumed
that weathermen were expected score maximizers, i.e., risk neutral. If forecasters are
risk averse then, as described by Kadane and Winkler [48], the forecasters will report
their risk neutral probabilities just like they would in a CDA prediction market. We
revisit this discussion in Chapter V when we analyze the impact of risk averse traders
in subsidized prediction markets.
Hanson [42] showed that if a trader is risk neutral and does not take into account
future payo"s, then she will report her true belief in a MSR prediction market, and
the amount of market subsidy in the market is bounded regardless of the number of
traders in the market. Moreover, as MSR markets are subsidized, these results hold
whether there is a large or a small number of traders present. Unfortunately, this
result hinges on two key assumptions:
1. Traders do not take into account future payo"s (in this setting we can think of
this as traders only trading once in a MSR market).
2. Traders are risk neutral.
Both of these assumptions do not hold in practice. Traders may trade any number of
times in a prediction market, thus giving them the opportunity to take into account
future payo"s, and traders are inherently risk averse. Therefore, in Chapter IV we
analyze the e"ect on MSR prediction markets of allowing traders to take into account
future payo"s, and in Chapter V we analyze the impact of risk averse traders in
prediction markets.
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MSR prediction markets may be presented as financial markets with traders buy-
ing and selling securities with the market maker. However, underlying this interface
is a price function (a price function determines the cost to buy and sell securities in
the market given the current market state) derived from scoring rules. Therefore, it
helps to think of these markets as traders simply reporting, in turn, to the market
maker a probability, their assessment on the probability of the event taking place,
and being scored with respect to this report. We denote by rt the report of the tth
trader in the market. For example, using the log proper MSR, if the tth trade in the
market, made by trader A, consists of a report rt when the previous report was rt!1,
trader A receives a reward that is an a!ne function of log(rt)" log(rt!1) if the event
occurs and a reward that is an a!ne function of log(1"rt)" log(1"rt!1) if the event
does not occur. For example, consider a risk neutral trader trading only once in a
market using the log MSR. She observes the current market position, the last made
report to the market maker, to be 0.3 and has an updated belief of 0.8 of the event
occurring. As this situation satisfies all of the conditions defined by Hanson [42], this
trader will report her true belief. If the event occurs, she stands to make a profit of
log 0.8" log 0.3 = log 0.80.3 , and if the event does not occur, she stands to make a loss
of log 0.2 " log 0.7 = log 0.20.7 , since making a report of 0.8 of the event occurring is
equivalent to making a report of 0.2 of the event not occurring.
3.3 Dynamics and Model
For the remainder of the dissertation we will only consider subsidized prediction
markets. In Chapter IV we consider market scoring rule prediction markets, and
in Chapter V we consider all subsidized prediction markets. Before we present our
results we will discuss how we model subsidized prediction markets.
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As previously mentioned, the purpose of prediction markets is to aggregate traders’
beliefs on the outcome of an event. Mathematically, we are interested in finding
P{%|s1, s2, . . . , sn}, where si is the signal, or private information, of trader i and % is
the event traded in the market. Initially we assume that every trader has a common
prior on the joint probability of the event and all of the other traders’ signals, i.e.,
P{%, s1, s2, . . . , sn}, P{%, si}, and P{si} ,i % {1, . . . , n}. Every trader observes her
private signal and forms a belief on the outcome of the event conditional on that
signal, i.e., the belief of trader i is P{%|si}.
Without loss of generality we assume that traders trade in turn (trader 1 trades
first, then trader 2, etc.). We do not assume the traders necessarily know the identity
of traders 1, 2, and so forth. Once trader 1 trades, all of the other traders update their
beliefs conditional on her trade. For example, assume that trader 1 is myopic and
risk neutral. This means she would report r1 = P{%|s1}, as every other trader knows
P{s1} and P{%, s1}, the other traders can deduce trader 1’s signal realization. Even
if the first trader does not honestly report her belief and instead reports a di"erent
value of r1, any trade she makes reveals some information on her signal realization.
Therefore, all other agents will update their belief on % in a Bayesian manner given
r1. With these updated beliefs, the second trader will trade and all of the other
traders, including the first, will update their beliefs. This continues until no trader
trades and the market is said to reach its equilibrium price.
In this dissertation we consider two slightly di"erent variants of the dynamics
above. In Chapter IV we consider a setting where every trader knows who the other
traders are. That is, if Alice is trader 1, Bob is trader 2, and Carol is trader 3, then
when trader 1 trades, all of the traders know Alice made a trade. Similarly if trader
3 trades, then all of the traders know Carol made a trade. On the other hand, in
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Chapter V, we assume the traders cannot tell who is making the actual report. The
main di"erence between these two settings is that if a trader were to trade repeatedly,
in the first setting (Chapter IV) traders can tell that the same trader made multiple
trades, and in the second setting (Chapter V) they cannot.
We can now introduce the notion of an information structure, defined in greater
detail in Section 5.2. An information structure describes the truthful prediction
(P{%|s1, s2, . . . , sn}) for all possible signal realizations for n traders, assuming each
trader trades in the market once. For example, for n = 3 and for every trader
having an equal probability of observing one of two signals (left, right), one possible
information structure is seen in Figure 3.1. In the figure, if trader 1 observed a right
signal and trader 2 observed a right signal, then the truthful prediction given those
observations would be 0.7. At that point, if the third trader observed a left signal,
then the truthful prediction would be 0.65. Had the signals observed by the three
traders been di"erent, a di"erent sequence of probability updates would result — all
possible outcomes are presented in the information structure.
The notation introduced in this chapter is common among the following two
chapters. In every chapter we will expand and simplify this notation as needed
so as to best convey the results.
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Figure 3.1: An example of an information structure
CHAPTER IV
Non-myopic Strategies in Prediction Markets
This chapter is based on joint work with Rahul Sami; parts were reported in [28,
29].
4.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter III, prediction markets may be used to aid in decision
making by aggregating the beliefs of participants on the outcome of a future event.
Ideally, the market participants truthfully reveal their beliefs, and all of their private
information is captured by the market. In this chapter, we characterize a class of
situations where risk neutral traders have an incentive to deviate from the truthful
strategy is a market scoring rule prediction market.
The successful aggregation of information through prediction markets thus relies
critically on traders adjusting their beliefs in response to other traders’ trades. How-
ever, this responsiveness can also have a drawback in the operation of the market: A
trader may attempt to first mislead other traders about the value of the security, and
then exploit their inaccurate information in later trades. Awareness of, and reaction
to, this problem can lead traders to be overly cautious about making inferences from
market prices, thus weakening the aggregative powers of the market. As a result,
prediction markets have always had to grapple with this perceived threat of manip-
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ulation, even when actual manipulation is absent. It would be very useful to have
a characterization of market situations in which such manipulation is possible (or
impossible); due to the strategic complexity of traditional double-auction markets,
such characterizations have been di!cult to achieve.
With the recent rapid growth of markets designed primarily for information aggre-
gation, researchers have developed new market designs that are tailored to incentivize
informed agents to trade and to reveal their private information in a timely manner.
Hanson’s market scoring rule [42] is an innovative tradable security; it is based on
the idea of a proper scoring rule [16]. Pennock’s dynamic pari-mutuel market [63]
is another new market design that is based on the traditional pari-mutuel market
form used in horse racing, but allows for early sale at a dynamically changing price
in order to encourage early trade by informed traders. Apart from their other ad-
vantages, these new market forms are promising for another reason: As one side of
each individual trade is held by an automated market maker with a predetermined
(and fairly simple) strategy, these market forms are much more amenable to formal
analysis. For the market scoring rules, it has been proven that honest revelation of
private information is myopically optimal [42]. A similar (although slightly weaker)
characterization of myopically optimal strategies in dynamic pari-mutuel markets is
reported by Nikolova and Sami [58]. However, much of the concern about manipu-
lation in prediction markets is based on non-myopic strategies: strategies in which
the attacker sacrifices some profit early in order to mislead other traders, and then
later exploits erroneous trades by other traders, thereby gaining an overall profit.
As yet, very little is known theoretically about the existence and characterization of
manipulative non-myopic strategies in these markets.
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Our Results
In this chapter, we study trading strategies in the logarithmic market scoring rule
prediction market. We model a general Bayesian framework in which traders receive
information signals relevant to the event to be predicted, and trade in the prediction
market to maximize their expected payo"s. Our model captures the fact that traders
learn from prior trades as well as their own signals. This way, the market itself is
represented as an extensive form game played between partially informed traders.
The logarithmic market scoring rule allows the traders’ moves and profits to be
connected to the information-theoretic notion of entropy. Our analysis builds on this
connection, and we show that it allows meaningful analysis of the informativeness of
market prices.
We show that, if traders’ initial signals are independent, it is generically true that
the myopically optimal strategy of trading honestly is not an equilibrium of this
extensive-form game. In other words, if a trader believes that future traders will
believe that she is playing myopically, she can profit by dishonest trading. Thus,
we demonstrate that strategies that involve deception of future traders are a real
possibility under a wide range of information conditions.
We propose a simple scheme, the discounted market scoring rule, in which traders’
payo"s for market transactions are explicitly discounted over time. This reduces
the potential gain from correcting a misled trader, thereby reducing the threat of
deceptive, non-myopic strategies. We analyze the market game in the presence of
discounting, and show that, although non-myopic trading might still be profitable,
the market converges to the optimum value (the probability of the event given the
traders’ signal realizations) in a very strong sense: In any equilibrium, the relative
entropy of the actual market price with respect to the optimal market price decreases
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exponentially over time, at a rate that can be lower-bounded in terms of the discount
factor. For a market operator who is running a prediction market to aggregate all
known information about a particular event, this provides a way to quantify and
limit the uncertainty in price accuracy due to non-myopic blu!ng strategies. Our
analysis also reveals conditions under which the myopic strategy is in fact the only
equilibrium strategy.
Related Work
There have been several field and experimental studies of manipulation in pre-
diction markets. Strumpf and Rhode [71] conducted experiments on manipulating
prices in the Iowa Electronic Market. Hanson et al. [44] experimentally study whether
agents with an incentive to manipulate prices can influence the trading price of a
security. They found that other agents who were aware of potential manipulation
adjusted for this possibility, thus limiting the e"ects of the manipulation attempts.
There is rich literature on manipulation in financial markets, which are closely
related. This literature has studied manipulation based on releasing false information
(perhaps through trades in other markets), as well as manipulation that only requires
strategic manipulation in a single market; the latter form of manipulation is closely
related to our study here. Allen and Gale [6] describe a model in which a manipulative
trader can make a deceptive trade in early trading rounds, and then profit in later
rounds, even though the other traders are aware of the possibility of deception and
act rationally. They use a stylized model of a multi-period market; in contrast, we
seek to exactly model a market scoring rule model. Apart from other advantages
of detailed modeling, this allows us to construct simpler examples of manipulative
scenarios: The model in [6] needs to assume traders with di"erent risk attitudes to
get around no-trade results, which is rendered unnecessary by the inherent subsidy
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in the market scoring. Our model requires only risk neutral traders, and exactly
captures the market scoring rule prediction markets. We refer readers to the paper
by Chakraborty and Yilmaz [17] for references to other research on manipulation in
financial markets.
Feigenbaum et al. [33] also study prediction markets in which the information
aggregation is sometimes slow, and sometimes fails altogether. In their setting,
the aggregation problems arise from a completely di"erent source: The traders are
nonstrategic, but extracting individual traders’ information from the market price is
di!cult. Here, we study scenarios in which extracting information from prices would
be easy if traders were not strategic; the complexity arises solely from the use of
non-myopic strategies.
Nikolova and Sami [58] present an instance in which myopic strategies are not
optimal in an extensive-form game based on the market, and suggest (but do not
analyze) using a form of discounting to reduce manipulative possibilities in a predic-
tion market. We draw on a generalization of this instance as the starting point of our
analysis. Plott et al. [9] also proposed a form of discounting in an experimental pari-
mutuel market, and showed that it promoted early trades. Unlike the pari-mutuel
market, the market scoring rule has an inherent subsidy, so it was not obvious that
discounting would have strategic benefits in our setting as well.
Our work is most closely related to independent work by Chen et al. [22, 23].
Chen et al. study non-myopic strategies in prediction markets; their initial re-
sults [23] were reported at the same time as the preliminary version of our results [28].
They study a similar Bayesian model of a market scoring rule market, with an in-
formation structure that di"ers in one key aspect from ours. Our nonexistence of
myopic equilibria results assume that traders’ signals are independently generated,
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and that di"erent combinations of the signals lead to di"erent expectations of the
event occurring. Chen et al. model signals as conditionally independent, conditioned
on the eventual truth of the event under consideration. This di"erence in models
leads to opposite results: they show that, under their model, following the myopic
strategy is an equilibrium strategy. This di"erence can be represented by looking at
the two settings in terms of complementary and substitutable information. In the
conditionally independent setting traders’ signals are substitutable. In our model,
the signals are complementary. When traders have substitutable signals, it becomes
a race between traders as to who will earn most of the profit available in the market
by truthfully revealing their information. However, when the signals are complemen-
tary, a trader stands to earn a larger reward if she knows the other trader’s signal.
Therefore, the first trader will blu" in hopes of having the second trader reveal some
information about their signal and thus the first trader stands to gain a larger profit
than by being truthful during the first trade. Both of these conditions can occur in
practice. For example, if traders are trying to predict the outcome of an election
where every trader is a voter, then a trader, knowing all of the other traders’ in-
formation, will earn all available profit in the market. However, if traders instead
are each asked the probability oil will be found in a particular well, then the traders
might have substitutable information. Further, Chen et al. [22] construct an example
three-round market in which the conditional independence condition does not hold,
and show that it admits an equilibrium strategy in which the first trader blu"s with
some nonzero probability.
Börgers et al. [15] study when signals are substitutes and complements in a general
setting. Our analysis and convergence result suggests that prediction markets are
one domain where this distinction is of practical importance.
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Structure of the Chapter
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: In Section 4.2 we describe the
2-player model we use to highlight deception threats, and we introduce some equi-
librium concepts. In Section 4.3, we formally analyze the simple 2-player model and
show that there exists no finite equilibrium in this setting. In Section 4.4 we gener-
alize the 2-player model to any finite number of players and signals and extend the
result to other scoring rules. In Section 4.5 we show that a simple discounted market
scoring rule reduces the opportunity for non-myopic strategies, and the market price
converges to the optimal price at a rate bounded in terms of the discounting param-
eter. In Section 4.6 we discuss how our results may be generalized and used to gain
insight about more complex markets. We draw parallels with classical bargaining
theory, and sketch directions for future research.
4.2 A Simple Model: Two Players and Two Signals Each
In this section, we describe a model of an extremely simple prediction market
setting. The setting is as follows: A prediction market is designed to predict a future
event %, by trading in a security F based on %. Two players, P1 and P2, are each
endowed with some private information about %. We assume the simplest possible
case, in which P1 and P2 each have a single bit of information (s1, s2 respectively)
relevant to %. (Equivalently, they each receive a signal that can take on two possible
values: 0 or 1). Further, we assume that the traders are risk neutral, and share a
common (and accurate) prior probability distribution over P1, P2, and %.
The prior probability distribution can be completely specified by specifying the
prior probabilities of the signals and the conditional probability of % given each
combination of signals. We assume that the two signals are independent. Further,
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we assume for simplicity that s1 is 0 or 1 with equal probability. The probability
that s2 is 1 is given by a parameter 0 < & < 1. Thus, the model can be fully specified
by specifying four probabilities p00 = P{%|s1 = 0, s2 = 0} (or P{%|00} for short),
p11 = P{%|11}, p01 = P{%|01} and p10 = P{%|10}. We study the behavior of the
market for di"erent values of the parameters p00, p11, p01, p10 and &. Note that pij
may be thought of as the probability of % given signals i and j. We summarize the
probability of % given the players’ signals in Table 4.1:






We assume that the trade in security F is conducted using a market scoring
rule [42]. Players make a sequence of market moves; in each move, the player reports
a probability ri. At the end, when the event % is revealed, the move earns a player
a net score Score(%, ri) " Score(%, ri!1), where S is some proper scoring rule. In
this chapter, we assume the logarithmic scoring rule. The market maker seeds the
market with a value ps which is irrelevant to our analysis. We consider a sequence
of alternating moves in which P1 moves first, P2 moves next, P1 potentially moves
again, and so on.
In a market using the logarithmic scoring rule, the score of any one move is
a constant multiple of log ri " log ri!1 if % occurs. Without loss of generality we
assume that the constant multiple is 1 for our analysis of the market scoring rule.




We now analyze the price dynamics if each trader followed her myopically optimal
strategy. There are two additional probabilities '0 and '1 that arise in the analysis
of the myopic behavior because of P1’s uncertainty of P2’s signal. Suppose P1
saw s1 = 1. She would then condition her prior on this information, resulting in
a posterior in which she ascribes probability & to the possibility that the optimal
probability (the probability of % given the traders’ signals) is p11, and probability
1" & to the possibility that the optimal probability is p10. In the balance, her belief
about the likelihood of % would be in between that implied by p11 and that implied
by p10. Therefore, her optimal myopic strategy if she observed s1 = 1 would be to
report probability '1 = &p11 +(1"&)p10, or simply the expected optimal probability
conditioned on her seeing 1 as her signal. Likewise, if P1 saw s1 = 0, she would move
to a point '0 defined in terms of p01 and p00.
After P1’s move P2 cannot directly see s1, but she can infer what P1’s myopic
actions would have been in each case. We assume that we are in the non-degenerate
case in which '0 (= '1; this allows us to focus on strategic threats instead of di!culties
in extracting signals from the price. Then, P2 can infer the value of s1; combining
this with the value of s2 that P2 observed, she can calculate the best possible estimate
of the conditional probability of %. Due to the myopic strategyproof properties of
the market scoring rules, P2 would move to p00, p01, p10, or p11. Subsequently, neither
player would have an incentive to move again. Thus, if players followed their myopic
strategies, the market would perform remarkably well: All information would be
aggregated optimally in just two trades. Further, in general, both players would
make a profit in expectation in this market.
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4.2.2 Non-myopic Behavior and Blu!ng
Now, suppose that the players were not restricted to myopic behavior. Specifically,
a player may deviate from the myopic strategy to exploit the other player’s reaction,
and make a greater total profit through subsequent moves. Consider the ways in
which P1 can deviate from her original myopic strategy. We restrict our attention to
strategies in which P1 moves to either '1 or '0 in the first round. These are the two
positions that P2 is expecting to see the market in, and thus we can reason about
the reaction that P2 would make to the move; this would be di!cult if the move was
to a di"erent point.
Thus, we are interested in the following kind of blu!ng strategies for P1: Suppose
P1 sees s1 = 1. She could move to '0 in the first round, instead of her myopically
optimal strategy of moving to '1. Now, if P2 is expecting myopic behavior, she would
incorrectly infer that s1 = 0, and correspondingly report the wrong probability: p00
instead of p10, or p01 instead of p11. P1 can see the reported probability by P2,
and make a subsequent correcting move: p00 # p10 or p01 # p11 respectively. P1’s
incentive to blu" is determined by the profitability of this blu!ng strategy relative
to the honest (myopic) strategy. If the myopic strategy is superior to blu!ng, for
both values of s1, P1 would follow this strategy. Then, P2 would have no reason to
blu" (because P1 would not move again). Thus, checking if the myopic strategy is
an equilibrium is equivalent to checking if P1’s expected profit from blu!ng is less
than her expected profit from the myopic strategy, assuming that P2 will be myopic.
Suppose that the blu!ng strategy has a strictly higher profit than the myopic
strategy for player P1. It follows that P1 will blu" with some probability (. Note that
P2 can analyze P1’s profit in di"erent scenarios, and thus, can infer that P1 would
not necessarily be truthful. Now, we characterize equilibria in which the blu!ng
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probability ( is known to P2, who takes it into account and reacts accordingly.
It must be that 0 < s < 1, because otherwise P2 would know s1 with certainty.
Now, from P2’s point of view, the market looks very similar to the market we just
analyzed for P1: She sees s2, and assigns some probability ( to s1 = 1. The myopic
optimal response for P2 taking into account the probability that P1 is blu!ng can
be determined: it is a function of (, s2 and the position ('1 or '0) that P1 left the
market. Next, we can repeat the analysis from P2’s point of view, and determine
if the myopic response is optimal for P2, or if she too would rather blu" with some
probability. The analysis follows exactly as done for P1, except that the role of s1 and
s2 are interchanged, or equivalently, the probabilities p01 and p10 are interchanged.
Next we show that with an informativeness condition for all points of p00, p11, p01,
and p10 the myopic strategy is not an equilibrium strategy for the two-player, two-
valued signal setting and in general for the n-player m-valued signal setting. Using
the informativeness condition we show that no finite equilibrium exists in both of
the settings for the logarithmic market scoring rule.
4.2.3 Equilibrium Concepts
The prediction market model we have described is an extensive-form game be-
tween two players with common prior probabilities but asymmetric information sig-
nals. Specifying a plausible play of the game involves specifying not just the moves
that players make for di"erent information signals, but also the beliefs that they
have at each node of the game tree.
Informally, an assessment Ai = ()i, µi) for a player i consists of a strategy )i
and a belief system µi. The strategy dictates what move the player will make at
each node in the game tree at which she has to move. We allow for strategies to be
(behaviorally) mixed; indeed, a blu!ng equilibrium must involve mixed strategies.
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To avoid technical measurability issues, we make the mild assumption that a player’s
strategy can randomize over only a finite set of actions at each node. The belief
system component of an assessment specifies what a player believes at each node of
the game tree. In our setting, the only relevant information a trader lacks is the
value of the other trader’s information signal. Thus, the belief at a node consists of
an assignment of a value to the probability that the other player received a ‘1’ signal,
contingent on reaching the node.
An assessment profile (A1, A2), consisting of an assessment for each player, is a
weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium i", for each player, the strategies are sequentially
rational given their beliefs and their beliefs at any node that is reached with nonzero
probability are consistent with updating their prior beliefs using Bayes’ rule, given
the strategies. This is a relatively weak notion of equilibrium for this class of games;
frequently, the refined concepts of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium or sequential equi-
librium are used. Our results involve proving the nonexistence of myopic weak PBEs,
and characterizing the set of all weak PBEs. They thus hold a fortiori for refinements
of the weak PBE concept, including those mentioned above. For a formal definition
of the equilibrium concept, we refer the reader to the book by Mas-Colell et al. [52].
Given the strategy components of a weak PBE profile, the belief systems of the
players are completely defined at every node on the equilibrium path (i.e., every node
that is reached with positive probability). In the remainder of this chapter, we will
not consider players’ beliefs o" the equilibrium path. Thus, we will abuse notation
slightly by simply referring to an “equilibrium strategy profile”, leaving the beliefs
implicit.
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4.3 Analysis of the Simple Model
Building on the intuition developed in Section 4.2.2, we now consider an analytical
proof to show that player 1 has an incentive to blu". It turns out to be easiest to
analyze the logarithmic market scoring rule in this case, because we can reduce it
to a standard result on information-theoretic (Shannon) entropy. At the end of the
section, we discuss why we expect this result to hold for other scoring rules.
4.3.1 Generic Blu!ng
In this subsection, we show that the myopic strategy profile is generically not a
weak Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
In order to show that there is a strictly profitable deviation from the myopic
strategy profile, we first need to exclude certain degenerate cases. In particular, we
restrict our attention to instances that satisfy the following general informativeness
condition:
Definition IV.1. An instance of the prediction market with n players satisfies the
general informativeness condition if there is no vector of signals for any n"1 players
that makes the nth player’s signals reveal no distinguishing information about the
optimal probability. Formally, for n = 2, the following property must be true:
,i, ī, j, j̄ such that i (= ī, j (= j̄: pij (= pij̄ and pij (= pīj. For n > 2, using the notation
of Section 4.4, we must have ,i ,j̄ (= j, p(j, i) (= p(j̄, i),where j, j̄ are two possible
signals for any one player, and i is a vector of signals for the other n" 1 players.
Consider a game of two players with each player seeing one of two signals. The
optimal probability if player 1 sees signal i and player 2 see signal j is pij. As before
we assume that player 2 has a probability of & of seeing a one. As player 1 is playing
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first, her honest belief, conditioned on her signal, would be given by:
'1 = &p11 + (1" &)p10 expectation if P1 sees s1 = 1
'0 = &p01 + (1" &)p00 expectation if P1 sees s1 = 0
The probabilities '1 and '0 determine the optimal myopic moves for player 1.
We first show that, if an equilibrium profile involves deterministic strategies, it
must be the myopic strategy profile:
Lemma IV.2. Consider any equilibrium strategy profile. If player 1 has a deter-
ministic strategy of playing 'u when she receives a 1 signal and 'v (= 'u when she
receives a 0, then 'u = '1 and 'v = '0.
Proof. Assume that 'u (= '1. Whenever player 1 plays 'u player 2 will deduce that
player 1 has observed a 1; then, player 2 will capture all remaining surplus. Player
1 thus gets at most the profit she earns from her first move. However, by definition
of myopic optimality, '1 would yield a higher profit to player 1 in the first round.
Therefore, player 1 has a profitable deviation in expected payo" from 'u to '1. A
similar argument holds for 'v and '0.
Consider the situation in which player 1 observes a 1 as her signal. We will want
to compare the expected profits that player 1 could earn through di"erent first-round
moves. Assume that the market starts at an arbitrary point ps. The market scoring
rule payo"s are additive, in the sense that the total payo" for two consecutive moves
is exactly the payo" of moving from the starting point to the end point of the second
move. Now, in order to estimate the relative profitability of blu!ng, we can think of
the blu!ng strategy as a move from ps to the honest position '1 followed by a move
from '1 to '0. Therefore, when comparing the two strategies the initial move ps to
'1 cancels out. In order to eliminate the irrelevant ps from our comparison, we treat
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the myopic move as if it had profit 0, and analyze the incremental profit or loss of
the move from '1 to '0.
We now express the expected profits in terms of information-theoretic entropy.
To this end, we observe that the following two expressions are equivalent:
S(pi, pj) The expected log score from moving from position pi to pj, with pj being
the true belief:
S(pi, pj) = pj log
pj
pi
+ (1" pj) log
1" pj
1" pi
D(pj||pi) The relative entropy of two probability mass functions p(x) and q(x) is










pj x = Y





pi x = Y
1" pi x = N
.
Lemma IV.3. Assume that Player 2 expects Player 1 to play honestly, and reacts
accordingly. If Player 1 observes s1 = 1 and blu"s, her expected increase in score
(over following the myopic strategy) is qD(p11||p01) + (1" q)D(p10||p00)"D('1||'0).
Proof. We analyze the change in Player 1’s score due to her two moves (deviation and
subsequent correction) separately. Given P1’s information (s1 = 1), the expected
probability of the event happening is '1. Thus, the expected deviation move score
for player 1 is:
S('1, '0) = '1 ln
$0
$1
+ (1" '1) ln 1!$01!$1
= "D('1||'0)
As player 2 has a probability of & of seeing a one, player 1 will have to have a
corrective step from p01 to p11 with probability &. Similarly with probability 1 " &
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player 1 will make her corrective step from p00 to p10. Therefore the expected score
from the corrective step is &S(p01, p11) + (1" &)S(p00, p10).
S(p01, p11) = p11 ln
p11
p01
+ (1" p11) ln 1!p111!p01
= D(p11||p01)
S(p00, p10) = p10 ln
p10
p00
+ (1" p10) ln 1!p101!p00
= D(p10||p00)
Theorem IV.4. Suppose two players are trading in a market with alternate moves;
without loss of generality, suppose P1 makes the first move. Suppose that the general
informativeness condition holds.
Then, there is no weak PBE strategy profile in which P1 always moves to some
'u in the first round when she sees s1 = 1, and P1 always moves to 'v (= 'u in the
first round when she sees s1 = 0.
Proof. Let ()1, )2) be a weak PBE equilibrium strategy. For contradiction, suppose
that )1 requires P1 to follow the myopic strategy in the first round. By lemma IV.2,
P1 must move to '1 when s1 = 1 and '0 when s1 = 0. Now, in equilibrium, P2 will
take this into account, and will therefore know both bits after the first round. She
can capture all the remaining surplus by moving to p00, p11, p01, p10 depending on s2
and the inferred value of s1. Thus, in any equilibrium, she will eventually move to
the optimal point. Now, consider a deviation from this strategy in which P1 blu"s
in the first round and corrects P2’s final move at the end. When s1 = 1, Lemma IV.3
shows that the expected additional score increase if P1 blu"ed is given by:
&D(p11||p01) + (1" &)D(p10||p00)"D('1||'0)
69
Now, from a well-known convexity property of the relative entropy [26, pp.30], we
have:
&D(p11||p01) + (1" &)D(p10||p00) )
D(&p11 + (1" &)p10||&p01 + (1" &)p00)(4.1)
. &D(p11||p01) + (1" &)D(p10||p00) )
D('1||'0)(4.2)
. &D(p11||p01) + (1" &)D(p10||p00)"D('1||'0) )
0(4.3)
Inequality (4.2) follows from the definition of '1 and '0. Thus, inequality (4.3)
implies that blu!ng is always at least as profitable as behaving myopically by
lemma IV.3. Moreover, inequality (4.3) is strict when & (= 0, 1 and p10 (= p00, p11; this
follows directly from the log sum inequality [26]. Thus, blu!ng will be a strictly prof-
itable deviation under the conditions of the theorem, and hence the myopic strategy
for P1 cannot be part of an equilibrium profile.
We observe that the general informativeness condition we assumed is su!cient
but not necessary.
4.3.2 Nonexistence of Finite Equilibrium
Theorem IV.4 and Lemma IV.2 show that there is no equilibrium in which player
1 follows a deterministic strategy that is dependent on her signal. If there was such
an equilibrium, then, in equilibrium, player 2 would infer player 1’s bit and move to
the optimal point.
Now, it follows that there is no weak PBE equilibrium strategy profile for the
extended trading game, under the same assumptions, that satisfies the condition
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that the market is in the optimal state with certainty after some finite number, k, of
rounds.
Theorem IV.5. Under the general informativeness condition there is no weak PBE
strategy profile in which the market is certain to be in the optimal state after k rounds,
for any finite k.
Proof. Suppose the general informativeness condition is met. By the log sum in-
equality, no matter the priors, i.e. the players beliefs of the other player’s signals, it
is always profitable for the player currently playing in the market to blu".
From theorem IV.4, there are two cases that could arise in equilibrium.
Case (i): P1 plays some strategy pu with certainty regardless of the value of s1. In
this case, P2 has learned nothing about P1’s bit, and thus, the conditions of the
theorem always hold after 1 round.
Case (ii): P1 plays a mixed strategy for at least one value of s1. Now, we claim that
there is a position 'u such that P1 moved to 'u with nonzero probability * when
s1 = 0 and with nonzero probability *# when s1 = 1. Suppose there was no such
'u. Then, the support of P1’s first-round strategy for di"erent values of s1 would
be completely disjoint, and thus, P2 could infer P1’s bit exactly. Thus, P1 would
e"ectively have a deterministic strategy; a simple extension of Lemma IV.3 shows
that the myopic strategy would be as good as this.
Observe that 'u is played with strictly positive probability. Further, conditioning
on P1 moving to 'u in the first round, P2 would assign some probability &̂ (= 0, 1 to
s1 = 1. P1’s beliefs about s2 haven’t changed at all after the first round. Thus, the
conditions of theorem IV.4 still hold after the first round, conditional on 'u being
played.
Repeating this argument for each of the first k " 1 rounds, and conditioning on
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one of the strategies in the support of each round, shows that the conditions of the
theorem still hold with some nonzero (albeit small) probability. Thus, the price
cannot converge with certainty after k rounds.
4.4 Generalizing the Results
We now move to a setting with n players and m signals each, for arbitrary n and
m. We will use the following notation:
M The set of all players.
i % {0, n" 1}n!1 is a vector of the signals for all players other than player i.
(j, i) % {0, n" 1}n is a vector of the signals for all players; j denotes player i’s signal.




&kik is the probability of players 2 through n of seeing the signals
specified in i.
p(j,i) is the optimal prediction with signal vector (j, i)
In the following scenario, assume that all players other than player 1 are behaving
myopically, and player k moves kth in the market. Below we determine if player 1
has an incentive to deviate from the myopic strategy. As player 1 is playing first we




&ip(j,i) if she sees signal j
For the following assume that player 1 observes j as her signal, but is contem-
plating pretending to have j̄ instead of following the myopic strategy.
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Claim IV.6. Player 1 has an expected score increase of
(
i
&iD(p(j,i)||p(j̄,i))"D('j||'j̄) if she blu"s and then corrects the position after others
have played myopically.
Proof. The change in expected score due to the initial deviation move is equivalent
to moving from 'j to 'j̄:
S('j, 'j̄) = 'j ln
$j̄
$j




As each player, k, has a probability of &kj of seeing j as her signal and is behaving
myopically it means that player 1 will move from p(j̄,i) to p(j,i) with probability &i.




For any given i:
S(p(j̄,i), p(j,i)) = p(j,i) ln
p(j,i)
p(j̄,i)








Theorem IV.7. The honest strategy profile is not a weak PBE equilibrium.
Proof. Player 1 will deviate from the myopic strategy if her expected score of devi-



















We use the following standard result on the convexity of the relative entropy, for any











Further, we note that equality can hold only if either all pi with +i > 0 are identical,
or pi = qi for at least one pair. (This is implicit in [26, pp. 29-30].)
By the general informativeness condition, p(j,i) (= p(j̄,i). This condition also implies
that, if ī is constructed by changing any one component of i, we have p(j,̄i) (= p(j,i).
As ī can occur with positive probability, the inequality (4.4) holds strictly.
4.4.1 Nonexistence of Finite Equilibrium
We can extend this result to show nonexistence of finite informative equilibria.
For contradiction, consider any weak PBE strategy profile ) that always results in
the optimal market prediction after some number t of rounds in a potentially infinite
game. By theorem IV.7, player 1 cannot play myopically in her first move under );
otherwise, she would have a profitable deviation. Thus, after some move that player
1 makes with positive probability under ), there must be at least two feasible values
of her signal that could have led to that move. We are now left with a reduced game
with a di"erent order of play, perhaps a smaller set of signals that player 1 could
have, and perhaps di"erent values of some &1j . ) must be consistent with a weak
PBE of this reduced game. However, the independence and general informativeness
conditions still hold. Thus, we can apply theorem IV.7 again. Inductively, we cannot
have convergence by any finite t.
Intuitively if a player has some private information that may be revealed by her
signal, she has an incentive to not fully divulge this information when she may
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play multiple times in the market. The general informativeness condition simply
guarantees that no matter the signal distribution, a player will always have some
private information revealed by her signal.
4.4.2 Implications for Other Scoring Rules
We believe that these results are not artifacts of the logarithmic scoring rule in
particular. The result above relies on the strict convexity of the Kullback-Leibler
divergence, the divergence associated with the log market scoring rule. The results
above holds for all scoring rules with strictly convex divergence functions. We be-
lieve that many, if not all, other scoring rules have an associated convex divergence
function. In particular, there is a strictly convex divergence function associated with
the quadratic market scoring rule as well. This means that a similar analysis holds
for the quadratic scoring rule.
4.5 Discounting and Entropy Reduction
In this section we propose a discounted market scoring rule, characterize equilibria
in this market in terms of entropy, and use this to show that the market converges
to the optimal price in any equilibrium.
4.5.1 The Discounted Market Scoring Rule
One way to address the incentives traders have to blu" in a market using the log
market scoring rule is to reduce future payo"s using a discount parameter, perhaps
resulting in an incentive to play the myopic strategy. Using this intuition, we propose
the discounted log-MSR market.
Let $ % (0, 1) be a discount parameter. The $-discounted market scoring
rule is a market microstructure in which traders update the predicted probability of
the event under consideration happening, just as they would in the regular market
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scoring rule. However, the value (positive or negative) of trade is discounted over
time. For simplicity, we assume a strict alternating sequence of trades. Suppose
a trader moves the prediction from p to q in his ith move, and the event is later
observed to happen. The trader would then be given a payo" of $i!1(log q " log p).
On the other hand, if the event did not happen, and the player moves the prediction
from p to q in his ith move he would earn a payo" of $i!1(log(1" q)" log(1" p)).
Using the definition of a market scoring rule price function as defined in [43], we
note that the price function in the $-discounted market scoring rule is (4.6).
(4.6)
exp((hi " ai)/(b · $t))&
j exp((hj " aj)/(b · $t))
hj is the amount of shares of security j sold so far. b and aj are constants defined
by the non-discounted market scoring rule.
Clearly, the myopic strategic properties of the market scoring rule are retained
in the discounted form. We will show that the discounted form can have better
non-myopic strategic properties.
We present a multiplicative form of discounting. However, there may be other
forms of discounting that could be used. One alternative would be to charge each
traders a fixed coupon price to trade in the mechanism. In particular, before any
trader trades they pay a fixed cost to the market maker. This approach may actually
disincentivize some traders from participating in this market if their expected profit
from participating without the fixed cost is less than the participation cost. Another
approach to discounting is to fix an ending time of the security. For example, the
market will be closed after 100 trades and the traders will receive their payo" once
the outcome of the event is observed. This approach has the advantage of each trader
revealing their true beliefs with their last trade in the market. However, closing the
event early eliminates the opportunity for traders to gather information past 100
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trades and have that information aggregated by the market. As the $-discounted
market scoring rule does not su"er from these drawbacks, we believe it is the way to
discount.
4.5.2 Convergence and Entropy Reduction
The discounted log-MSR may admit equilibria in which players play non-myopic
strategies, i.e., they blu" with some probability. We want to show that, in any
weak-PBE profile ), the market price will converge towards the optimal value for
the particular realized set of information signals. In other words, although complete
aggregation of information may not happen in two rounds, it does surely happen in
the long run.
We now present a natural metric Di that quantifies the degree of aggregation in
the prediction market after any number of trades of strategy profile ): Di is the
expectation, over all possible signal realizations and the randomization of moves as
dictated by ), of the relative entropy between the optimal price (given the realization
of the signals) and the actual price after i rounds.
Formally, for a strategy profile ), and a number of rounds i, a signal node ,
consists of a realization of the signals of the two players, and a sequence of i trades
in the market. The aggregative e"ect of the strategy profile ) is summarized by the
collection of signal nodes , that can be reached, the market price ri(,) after the last
trade in ,, and the associated ex-ante probability P{,} of reaching each such signal






where r$(,) denotes the optimal trading price given the realization of signals in
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,. Hereafter, we abuse notation by merely writing Di for Di()); the profile under
consideration is obvious from the context. For i = 0, the signal nodes , correspond
to di"erent realizations of the signals.
If Di = 0, it implies that the market will always have reached its optimal price for
the realized signals by the ith rounds. If Di > 0, it indicates that, with positive prob-
ability, the market has not yet reached the optimal price. Di is always nonnegative,
because the relative entropy is always nonnegative.
We now show that, in addition to measuring the distance from full aggregation, Di
also enables interesting strategic analysis. The key result is that Di can be related to
the expected payo" of the ith round move in the non-discounted (standard) log-MSR:
Lemma IV.8. Let M i denote the expected profit (over all signal nodes ,) of the ith





P{,}[r$(,)[log ri " log ri!1]






This first equality holds by the definition of M i and the second by the definition of
relative entropy.
This suggests another interpretation for Di: Di represents the expected value of
the potential profit left for trades after the ith trade.
Given the definition of M i, we can now define M̃ i as the expected profit of the
ith trade in the discounted log MSR. We have assumed discounting after every even
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trade, i.e., after every trade by player 2.




$k(D2k "D2k+1) ,i = 2k
$k(D2k+1 "D2(k+1)) ,i = 2k + 1






= D0 "D1 + $(D2 "D3) + . . .





= D1 "D2 + $(D3 "D4) + . . .
We reiterate that the definition of Di is not dependent on $; it is a measure of the
informational distance between the prices after i trades in profile ) and the optimal
prices. Of course, the stability of a given strategy profile ) may change with $.
4.5.3 Bounding Relative Entropy
In this section, we bound the value of Dn for large n, in any weak PBE. Recall
that an instance of the two-person market game consists of a set of optimal points for
di"erent signal realizations {p00, p01, p10, p11} and prior beliefs &1 and &2 about the
probability that player 1 (and player 2, respectively) will receive the 1 signal. The
optimal points remain unchanged through the entire course of trade, but the players’
beliefs about each other’s signal distribution changes as trade proceeds. Thus, it is
useful to separate the instance description into a configuration {p00, p01, p10, p11} and
a signal distribution (&1, &2).
We will express our convergence bound in terms of an invariant of the market
configuration, the complementarity coe!cient, which we define below. Fix a par-
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ticular configuration of the optimal points. Now, any pair of probabilities (&1, &2)
determines an instance of the game. Let ,1M(&1, &2) denote the expected profit of
player 1 if she traded first, and followed the myopically optimal (i.e., honest) trading
strategy in the first round of trade. Similarly, let ,2M(&1, &2) denote the expected
profit of player 2 if player 2 had traded first, and followed the myopically optimal
(i.e., honest) trading strategy in the first round of trade. Let D0(&1, &2) denote the
initial profit potential of this instance: the expected total profit in moving from ps
to the optimal point. In other words, D0(&1, &2) represents the sum of both players’
expected profits if they both followed the myopic strategy. Now, define the comple-




D0('1,'2) . The reason for using the term
‘complementarity’ comes from the following observation. Under the myopic strategy
profile, whichever order the players trade, their total profit will be D0(&1, &2). If
this is greater than the sum of what they could each have earned playing first, i.e.,
,1M(&1, &2) + ,
2
M(&1, &2), then this indicates that their individual bits of information
have increasing marginal value, i.e. they are complements. The lower C(&1, &2)
is, the greater the complementarity of information. Finally, let the complementarity
bound C of the configuration be the minimum, over all values of (&1, &2), of C(&1, &2).
Under our independence assumption C(&1, &2) is always less than 1; indeed, if it
were greater than 1, the myopic strategy profile would be an equilibrium. We do not
yet have a good characterization of the complementarity coe!cient. However, based
on sample configurations, we have observed that it is nontrivial (not always 0), and
often quite close to 1. Note that if C = 0, the myopic strategy may not involve any
movement by either player, and thus, we could have lack of information aggregation
even with the myopic strategy. We exclude such degenerate cases, and assume that
C > 0.
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Now, fix a discount parameter $, and a particular instance (including probabilities
(&1, &2)) of the two-person market game induced by the $-discounted log-MSR. Let
) be any weak PBE of this market game.
Without loss of generality we assume that player 2 moves second in the market.
In the first round, player 1 will follow some (perhaps mixed) strategy )1 dictated by
). Under the equilibrium strategy profile ), player 2 will revise her beliefs consistent
with the profile ) and the realized move. Let ,2M |)1 denote the expected profit of
player 2 if she played her myopically optimal strategy conditioned on her revised
beliefs. From theorem IV.9 we note that ,2M |)1 ) ,2M .
Theorem IV.9. ,2M |)1 ) ,2M
Proof. Consider any strategy ) for player 1 such that setting )1 = ) minimizes
,2M |)1. We will show that ) must involve player 1 not moving the market price at
all.
We will first argue that ) has support on a single point only. If not, then )
would have support over a set of points: at least two points A, B, and perhaps a
set of other points R. In this case, we show that we can construct a strategy )#
that reduces the objective function by “mixing” points A and B. For simplicity, we
assume that &1 = 0.5, i.e., that player 1 has equal chance of seeing either a 1 or a 0.
Any other value of &1 can easily be substituted into the proof below, but it would
slightly clutter the notation. Define uA and uB as the probability (under )) that
player 1 will play A and B given she saw 1 as her signal. Similarly we define vA and
vB as the probability player 1 will play A and B given she saw 0 as her signal. Let
pA be the probability player 1 plays A and similarly pb be the probability player 1
plays B. Without loss of generality let pB < pA. Define # = P{s1 = 1|A} = uApA and
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! = P{s1 = 1|B} = uBpB . With these definitions we can define the myopic move of
player 2 given that market is at A and s2 = 1 as '"1 = #p11 + (1 " #)p01; likewise,




1 are defined as the myopic
moves of player 2 given the market is at B.
Now, let C = (A+B)/2 be the midpoint of A and B, and consider a new strategy
)# over points A, C, and the same set of remaining points R. Under )# she will mix
over A and C with probability pA"pB and 2pB respectively. As before we can define











= "+!2 . We can now define the myopic
move of player 2 given the market is at C and s2 = 1 as '
(
1 = "p11 + (1 " ")p01.
Likewise if s2 = 0 and the market is at C the myopic move of player 2 is defined as
'(0 = "p10 + (1" ")p00.
We now characterize ,2M |) as:
,2M |) = 0.5(pA " pB)[qD('"1 ||q'"1 + (1" q)'"0 )
+(1" q)D('"0 ||q'"1 + (1" q)'"0 )]
+0.5pB[qD('"1 ||q'"1 + (1" q)'"0 )










1 + (1" q)'
!
0 )]
+ remaining profit over R
We also characterize ,2M |)# as follows, writing pA as (pA " pB) + pB to facilitate
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comparison with )#:
,2M |)# = 0.5(pA " pB)[qD('"1 ||q'"1 + (1" q)'"0 )
+(1" q)D('"0 ||q'"1 + (1" q)'"0 )]
+0.5 · 2pB[qD('(1 ||q'
(





1 + (1" q)'
(
0)]
+ remaining profit over R











2 . This means that ,
2
M |)# can be bounded as :
,2M |)# = 0.5(pA " pB)[qD('"1 ||q'"1 + (1" q)'"0 )
+(1" q)D('"0 ||q'"1 + (1" q)'"0 )]
+0.5 · 2pB[qD('(1 ||q'
(





1 + (1" q)'
(
0)]
+ remaining profit over R
= 0.5(pA " pB)[qD('"1 ||q'"1 + (1" q)'"0 )





























+ remaining profit over R
< 0.5(pA " pB)[qD('"1 ||q'"1 + (1" q)'"0 )
+(1" q)D('"0 ||q'"1 + (1" q)'"0 )]
+0.5pB[qD('"1 ||q'"1 + (1" q)'"0 )










1 + (1" q)'
!
0 )]
+ remaining profit over R
= ,2M |)
The last inequality follows from the strict convexity of relative entropy under the
general informativeness condition.
Therefore, for any strategy ) with two or more points in its support, there always
exists a strategy )# such that ,2M |)# < ,2M |). This means that for any strategy, ), for
player 1 that minimized ,2M |) the strategy must have only one point in its support.
Thus, the strategy does not reveal any information about player 1’s bit to player 2.
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Suppose that the point in the support, pi, is such that pi (= ps. This again contradicts
the fact that ) minimizes ,2M |), as player 2 will always make a positive payo" in
expectation if she moves from pi to ps; thus, she would have a larger payo" overall if
player 1 left the market at pi instead of ps. Therefore the strategy that minimizes the
expected payo" of player 2 is for player 1 to report ps. However, player 1 reporting
ps is equivalent to her not trading at all in the first round. Therefore we have shown
that ,2M |) ) ,2M .
(where, for clarity, we have suppressed the dependence on (&1, &2)). Intuitively
the result of the theorem holds, as any move by player 1 reveals some information
to player 2 in equilibrium. Any such information would be used by player 2 to
reduce her uncertainty on the observed bit of player 1. Due to the complementarity
of signals, this results in a higher expected profit for player 2 than if she had no
information at all. The latter is equivalent to the situation in which player 2 moves
first.
Recall that after the second round, the total expected payo" of both players is at
most $D2. We also know that the total expected payo" of player 1 in equilibrium
is at least ,1M ; if not, a simple deviation to the myopic strategy would be beneficial.
By theorem IV.9, the total expected payo" of player 2 in equilibrium is also at least
,2M . This means that the total payo" of the first two rounds in the market is at least
,1M + ,
2
M " $D2. Therefore we can bound D2 as:
D2 ! D0 " [,1M + ,2M " $D2]
This argument generalizes to any even number of rounds, by looking at the total
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expected profits within the first 2k moves, and the remaining profit potential $kD2k:
D2k ! D0 " [,1M + ,2M " $kD2k](4.8)










/. D2k ! D
0 (1" C(&1, &2))
1" $k(4.9)
Note that for any configuration, by definition, C(&1, &2) ) C. Thus, we can
rewrite inequality (4.9) as:
(4.10) D2k ! D
0(1" C)
1" $k
From inequality (4.10) we see that the bound on D2k depends only on $, as D0
and C are both constants for any configuration of pij. Now, consider the remainder
of the game after k rounds. After any particular sequence of moves that occurs
with positive probability, the players would have updated their beliefs about the
other player’s bit. Thus, the players are left to play a slightly di"erent instance
of the 2-player market game, and for smaller stakes. But the configuration of the
optimal points stays the same. Therefore, the equilibrium profile ) will also induce
an equilibrium profile on the instance of the game after 2k rounds. Now, we can
repeat this argument to bound D4k in terms of D2k, etc.
In this way, we rewrite inequality (4.10) in terms of $ and for a round n = 2km.
We set k such that $k/2 = C, i.e. k = 2 log Clog # . Using this value of k and a value
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= D0(1 + $k/2)!m = D0(1 + C)! n2k
= D0(1 + C)!
n log #
4 log C = D0$n
! log(1+C)
4 log C
Note that ! log(1+C)4 log C depends only on complementarity coe!cient of the market
configuration. Moreover, the value of ! log(1+C)4 log C > 0 as C < 1 from the independence
condition. Therefore, inequality (4.11) shows that the relative entropy of the prices
with respect to the optimal prices reduces exponentially over time.
Further, the mechanism designer can reduce the value of $ to speed up the con-
vergence to optimum in any weak PBE. One caveat: rapid discounting results in
rapidly reducing available profits, and thus, may dissuade traders from participating
in the market.
4.6 Discussion and Future Work
In this chapter, we analyze non-myopic strategies in a two-player prediction mar-
ket setting. We find that the myopic strategies are generically not in equilibrium
when non-myopic strategies are admitted, under our independent signals assump-
tion. In a real market, there may be other reasons why players prefer the myopically
optimal strategies: In particular, they are much simpler to play, and more robust,
and the potential gains from blu!ng are often very small. Thus, our results are not
in any way meant to imply that market scoring rules are not a useful microstructure
for organizing a market. Instead, we believe that the analysis suggested here will
be useful in clarifying when markets might be especially susceptible to long-range
manipulative strategies. The contrast between our results and the results of Chen
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et al. [22] are especially intriguing. One exciting direction for future research is to
fully characterize the class of information structures on which myopic strategies are
in equilibrium, and more importantly, are the only equilibrium.
We use a simple modification to the market scoring rule, which includes a form of
discounting, to ameliorate this potential problem. This allowed us to prove a bound
on the rate at which the error of the market, as measured by the relative entropy
between perfect aggregation and the actual price distribution, reduces exponentially
over time. The exponent depends on the “complementarity coe!cient” of the in-
stance. One important direction for future work is to characterize or bound this
function; this will lead to a more complete understanding of the convergence rate.
The need for discounting shows a connection to bargaining settings, in which
players bargain over how to divide a surplus they can jointly create. In a prediction
market, informed players can extract a subsidy from the market maker; moreover,
players can pool their information together to make sharper predictions than either
could alone, and thus extract an even larger subsidy. They might engage in blu!ng
strategies to bargain over how this subsidy is divided. Explicit discounting can make
this bargaining more e!cient.
CHAPTER V
Subsidized Prediction Markets for Risk Averse Traders
This chapter is based on joint work with Marina Epelman and Rahul Sami; parts
were reported in [30].
5.1 Introduction and Related Work
As discussed in Chapter III, Hanson [42] has shown that, for risk neutral agents
who are myopic (i.e., do not account for the e"ect of their trades on other traders),
it is optimal for each trader to reveal her true beliefs of the outcome of the traded
event in a market scoring rule market. This results leaves two questions:
1. What happens when agents take into account future payo"s?
2. What happens when agents are not risk neutral?
The first question was partially addressed in Chapter IV and results are further
expanded on in Chen et al. [20] by showing that if agents have complementary in-
formation, a mixed strategy of blu!ng with a certain probability is an equilibrium
strategy, and if agents have substitutable information, then the truthful strategy is
an equilibrium strategy.
In this chapter, we tackle the second question: What happens when agents are
not risk neutral? In practice, most people are better modeled as being risk averse
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in their decision making. We model traders as expected-utility maximizers with an
arbitrary weakly monotone and concave utility functions that captures their risk
aversion. Current prediction market mechanisms, like the market scoring rule or the
dynamic pari-mutuel market [63], do not always give appropriate incentives to risk
averse traders. For example, a su!ciently risk averse informed trader, who knows
that an event will occur with 80% probability even though the current price is 50%,
may not want to push up the price in a market scoring rule market because of the
20% chance of making a loss. This observation suggests that subsidized prediction
markets using the current mechanisms may converge to a non-truthful1 price in a
sequential equilibrium. As prediction markets are used in the corporate setting for
forecasting future events [24], a decision maker running such a market might make
the wrong decision as a result of a non-truthful equilibrium due to the presence of
risk averse traders.
If traders have known risk aversion, the scoring rules could be adjusted to com-
pensate, retaining the original incentive properties. In this chapter, we focus on
the more common setting, in which traders have unknown risk aversion, and study
whether it is possible to modify the market mechanism to guarantee myopic honesty
while preserving other desirable properties of prediction markets. We first list a set
of properties that any prediction market-like mechanism should satisfy: (1) myopic
strategyproofness; (2) sequential trade, giving traders the opportunity to update be-
liefs; (3) a variant of sybilproofness, capturing the idea that trading under multiple
identities does not yield any direct advantage; and (4) boundedness of the expected
subsidy.
1As discussed in Chapter III, risk averse agents may participate, but will report their risk neutral probabili-
ties. Since risk neutral probabilities are reported, the market will converge to an equilibrium in the risk neutral
probabilities. In this situation we say that the market is converging to a non-truthful equilibrium.
90
We propose one mechanism that satisfies all of these properties, even in the pres-
ence of traders with unknown risk averse preferences. The key building block of our
result is a technique, developed by Allen [5], of scoring forecasters by varying their
probability of winning a fixed reward. We note that the proposed mechanism has the
undesirable property of reducing the expected reward exponentially with the number
of agents.
We then establish that such exponentially decreasing rewards are unavoidable for
any mechanism satisfying all the properties listed above. It is natural for traders to
have lower expected rewards in some contexts, such as when they have no private
information; to exclude trivial examples of decreasing rewards, we normalize all re-
wards by a measure of the intrinsic informativeness of a trader’s private information.
We show that exponential decrease in the normalized expected reward is necessary for
any mechanism that satisfies the properties we propose in the presence of arbitrarily
risk averse agents. The consequence of this result is that, in any such mechanism,
even a trader with a significant amount of private information might find that she
can earn a very minute amount if the number of traders is large.
Related Work
In this chapter we only consider subsidized prediction markets. Therefore, in this
section we look specifically at risk aversion in scoring rules and subsidized prediction
markets. Prior work on risk aversion in unsubsidized prediction markets is summa-
rized in Chapter III. Hanson [42] introduced the concept of a market scoring rule, a
form of subsidized prediction market, and proved a myopic strategyproofness prop-
erty for risk neutral traders, as well as a bound on the total subsidy. Pennock [63]
introduced another mechanism, the dynamic pari-mutuel market, for a subsidized
prediction market. Both these mechanisms introduce some of the properties in Sec-
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tion 5.2. However, both mechanisms assume risk neutrality of the traders, which
is not assumed in this chapter. Lambert et al. [50] introduced a self-financed wa-
gering mechanism, i.e., one that is not subsidized, and introduced properties that
such a mechanism must satisfy and showed a class of mechanisms that satisfy these
properties. The authors assumed risk neutral traders and an absence of subsidy in
the mechanism. Chen and Pennock [21], and later generalized by Agrawal et al. [3],
considered a risk averse market maker in a subsidized market and showed that the
market maker has bounded subsidy in most forms of risk aversion. This line of work
is useful to show that even a risk averse market maker would be interested in sub-
sidizing a market; however, unlike this chapter, the incentive consequence of risk
averse traders were not addressed.
As discussed in Chapter III, the market scoring rule prediction market mechanism
is based on scoring rules, which originally were introduced to measure the accuracy
of weather forecasters. In order to address risk aversion in subsidized prediction
markets, we look at previous work on risk aversion in scoring rules. Winkler and
Murphy [78] showed that, if forecasters have a known risk type, scoring rules can
be transformed to recapture the honest reporting property. Chen et al. [19] and
O"erman et al. [59] provided one approach to handling forecasters with unknown
risk type: they proposed first figuring out every participant’s risk type by asking
them a series of questions, and then calibrating their future reports using this data.
This mechanism may work for a prediction market mechanism if the group of traders
can be pre-screened. However, this may not be the case, and ideally we would like
to have an “online” mechanism that can handle traders regardless of their risk type
without any calibration. Allen [5] proposed one such “online” scoring rule for traders
with arbitrary risk type. Our mechanism is based on Allen’s result, and we discuss
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this idea in Section 5.3.
5.2 Model, Notation, and Definitions
In this section and Section 5.4 we consider a class of mechanisms defined by a set
of properties each mechanism in the class satisfies. These properties are satisfied by
most subsidized prediction markets described in literature. We do not claim that the
outlined properties are su!cient to completely characterize the space of prediction
market mechanisms; rather, they identify a class of broad market-like mechanisms.
We first describe our basic model of the information and interaction setting in which
the mechanism operates, and then list the properties that the mechanisms we study
should satisfy.
We consider a class of mechanisms designed to aggregate information from a set
of agents (or traders) in order to forecast the outcome of a future event %. Each
agent i receives a private information signal, si, relevant to the outcome of the event;
we assume si is binary, as is %.
As before, in the market-like mechanisms that we consider, the agents sequentially
interact with the mechanism through trades or reports, each of which expresses a
predicted probability of the event. Reports are public, and other agents can update
their beliefs based on the observed history of reports. We use rk % [0, 1] to denote
the kth report made in the market, and let µk = (r1, · · · , rk!1) denote the history
up to the start of the kth trade. rk can thus depend on µk as well as any private
information available to the trader making the report. We let n denote the total
number of trades in the market.
The agents provide names while making reports, but in this chapter we consider
a setting in which the identity of the agents making the reports cannot be verified,
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and that the total number of participating agents is not known. We assume that
no agent is identified more than once in a sequence of trades. An agent may, how-
ever, masquerade as multiple agents, which will be important in our consideration
of sybilproofness. This requirement to treat each trade as if it were from a separate
agent is natural for a market setting.
Once the true outcome of the event is realized, % = 1 if the event occurs and
% = 0 if the event does not occur, the mechanism determines the reward for every
agent. The reward for agent i, -(ri, µi, n,%), is a function of the report of the
agent, the market state at the time the report has been made, the total number
of agents participating in the mechanism, and the outcome of the event. We allow
the mechanism to randomize the distribution of the rewards, and we propose one
such mechanism in Section 5.3. We assume that the reward does not depend on any
reports made in the future. This is a nontrivial technical assumption that enables
us to simplify the analysis of agents’ myopic strategies, as agents can make decisions
based on their current beliefs about the outcome, without forming beliefs about
future agents’ signals and strategies. This assumption is satisfied by most securities
markets as well as market scoring rule markets, but is not necessarily true for pari-
mutuel markets.
Every agent i values the reward distributed to her by the mechanism according
to her value function Vi(·), where Vi(·) is a weakly monotone increasing concave
function. We make the normalizing assumption that Vi(0) = 0. In order to make her
report, the agent maximizes her expected value E)%piVi(-(r, µi, n,%)) over possible
reports r % [0, 1]. The expectation above is taken over the outcome of the event
(with respect to the agent’s true belief pi, as emphasized by the notation), as well as
any randomization of the mechanism over the rewards. Though there may be other
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sources of uncertainty in the mechanism, we do not consider them in our model.
We identify the properties mechanisms should satisfy by examining the literature
in prediction market design and other wagering mechanisms. In recent literature
there is work on characterizing properties of subsidized prediction markets. Han-
son [42], in introducing the market scoring rules required a subsidized prediction
market be myopically strategy proof, meaning that an agent not considering future
reward will maximize her payo" by reporting her true belief on the outcome of the
event. Similarly, he required that the subsidized prediction market have bounded
market subsidy. The same properties also hold in the dynamic pari-mutuel market
introduced by Pennock [63]. Due to the fact that both Hanson’s and Pennock’s mech-
anisms were subsidized, both had guaranteed liquidity by having a market maker that
is always willing to trade with an agent using a predetermined price function. Predic-
tion markets provide anonymity, i.e., the reward given due to a report is independent
of who made the report. Finally, prediction markets are sybilproof, meaning that an
agent reporting once with some information is no better o" reporting twice in the
market (using di"erent names, commonly referred to as sybils) with the exact same
information. We note that though anonymity and sybilproofness were not explicitly
stated by Hanson or Pennock, they still hold in their proposed mechanisms and were
explicitly defined by Lambert et al. [50]. The definition of sybilproofness we give is a
relaxation of that presented by Lambert et al. in that we require the agent being no
better o" reporting twice, while they require the agent receive the exact same payo"
regardless of the agent reporting once or twice.
Using the notation established above, we formally define the desired properties:
P1: Myopically Strategyproof: Let pi be the true belief of the agent making the
ith trade, this belief being determined by the market history up to trade i, µi,
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and her signal, si. If this agent trades only once in a market, her reported belief,
which maximizes her expected utility in a myopically strategy proof mechanism,
will be her true belief,. Equivalently, if an agent does not take future payo"
into consideration, she will report her true belief. Mathematically, for any n,
i % {1, . . . , n} and µi,
pi = arg max
r"[0,1]





(As mentioned above, we use the notation E)%pi to represent the expectation
over the outcome of the event % with respect to beliefs pi, as well as, if appro-
priate, any randomization of the mechanism over the rewards.) Further, we also
require that the expected value an agent gets as a result of such report, which
we refer to as an honest trade, should be non-negative. In other words, our
notion of myopic strategyproofness includes a standard individual rationality
condition.
P2: Sybilproofness: A mechanism is sybilproof if an agent is no worse o" re-
porting once in this mechanism than consecutively reporting more than once.
Equivalently, an agent reporting in a mechanism with her private belief will not
increase her expected value by reporting more than once with the same belief.
For ease of analysis we consider a slightly weaker condition of reporting twice
being no better than reporting once; our results hold for any number of consec-
utive trades. Mathematically, for any n, i % {1, . . . , n} and µi, as well as any
reports r(1) and r(2),
(5.2)
E)%piVi(-(pi, µi, n,%)) ) E)%piVi(-(r(1), µi, n + 1, %) + -(r(2), µi+1, n + 1, %)),
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where µi+1 = (µi, r(1)).
Note that this definition embodies a limited, myopic form of a sybil attack. In
particular, it states that consecutive trading under di"erent identities is not prof-
itable, but does not rule out attacks involving non-consecutive trades. As dis-
cussed in the previous chapter, dishonest trading with multiple non-consecutive
trades may be profitable even with current market mechanisms and risk neu-
tral traders; further, the profitability of such attacks depends on the specific
information distribution pattern as well as the mechanism chosen. In order to
make a clean comparison to current market forms, we focus on simpler attacks
involving consecutive trades only.
P3: Bounded Subsidy: There exists an upper bound ! on the expected value of
the subsidy the market maker needs to invest into the market. That is, for any
number of trades in the market, n, and any collection of reports ri % [0, 1], i %








Here we use E) to denote that the expectation is taken with respect to the true
probability of the event taking place.
To summarize, we define the class of market-like mechanisms to be all mechanisms
that guarantee liquidity, are anonymous, myopically strategy proof and sybilproof, and
have bounded market subsidy.
Before we introduce our results, we must introduce the concepts of information
structure, report informativeness, and expected normalized reward.
Information Structure: Recall that we define an information structure to consist
of a set of possible signal realizations for each trader, and the posterior prob-
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ability of the event given a subset of signal realizations (equivalently, the joint
probability of signal realizations and the event outcome). An information struc-
ture can be represented as a tree of possible trading histories that would arise
if each agent honestly reported her belief.
Informativeness: For a given information structure, we define informativeness of
an agent k as the expected relative entropy reduction of the posteriors after
including agent k’s signal into the history. The relative entropy, or Kullback-
Leibler divergence, between p and q is defined as (see [26, Chapter 2]):
D(p||q) ! p log p
q
+ (1" p) log 1" p
1" q .
Let p(µk) denote the posterior probability of the event after the first k signals
are revealed. The informativeness of k is then defined as the expectation, over
all future histories (all future traders’ signal realizations) in the information
structure, of D(%||p(µk!1)) " D(%||p(µk)), where the outcome % is treated as
a distribution with all mass on the eventual outcome. This definition of infor-
mativeness measures how much each agent’s report contributes to reducing the
uncertainty about the event’s occurrence.
Expected Normalized Reward: The informativeness and reward of an agent’s
report depend on the history of previous trades. Therefore, in order to compare
the reward an agent receives from a report, we define the expected normalized
reward. Note that we assumed agents are expected value maximizers; therefore,
to compare the reward between agents, we normalize the expected reward they
receive by the informativeness of that report. For example, if an agent with in-
formativeness h and posterior belief pi reports ri, she expects to receive a reward





In this section we review the work presented by Allen [5] and then present one
mechanism that satisfies the properties outlined in Section 5.2.
5.3.1 Allen’s Result
We first explore the core of Allen’s result involving a single trader who is an
expected value maximizer with an increasing value function V (·). We assume that
the trader has unknown risk preference, i.e., while function V (·) is known to be
monotone, its exact form is not known to the market-maker. The trader is asked to
predict the probability of an outcome %.
Suppose the trader gives her assessment, p̂, on the outcome of the event, while
her true belief is p. If the event occurs, she receives a reward of 1 with probability
q(p̂) = 1" (1" p̂)2, and if the event does not occur, she receives a reward of 1 with
probability q̂(p̂) = 1" p̂2.
As the trader is maximizing her expected value, she will maximize over p̂
E)%pV (p̂) = p[q(p̂)V (1) + (1" q(p̂))V (0)] + (1" p)[q̂(p̂)V (1) + (1" q̂(p̂))V (0)],
and thus set p̂ = p, as long as V (1) > V (0). Therefore, in an Allen sweepstake (the
q(·) and q̂(·) functions are referred to as sweepstake functions), a trader will reveal
her true belief to maximize her expected reward value. Note that this report also
maximizes the probability of winning the sweepstake.
Allen’s result follows from the fact that the expected value is linear in p (the
probability of winning), and regardless of the form of the value function, as long as










is satisfied will result in an expected value maximizing player revealing her true be-
liefs. The condition above means that Allen’s sweepstake functions can be generalized
to q(p̂) = a" b(1" p̂)2 and q̂(p̂) = c" bp̂2.
5.3.2 Proposed Sweepstakes
In this section we propose one possible sweepstakes method that is a generalization
of Allen’s result. Consider the following serial sweepstakes:
1. Each agent, in order, observes the previous agents’ reports, and plays an in-
dividual sweepstake as defined by Allen with generalized sweepstake functions
described in Section 5.3.1.
2. The outcome of the event is observed.
3. If there are n reports in the mechanism, then each player reporting p̂ wins a
reward of 1 with probability q(p̂) = 14n (1 " (1 " p̂)
2) if the event occurred and
q̂(p̂) = 14n (1" p̂
2) if the event did not occur.
As the discussion below demonstrates, this method satisfies the desired properties
outlined in Section 5.2.
Guaranteed liquidity: As each agent, by making a report, participates in an Allen
sweepstake, she is guaranteed a nonnegative payo", thus guaranteeing liquidity.
Anonymity: As each agent receives a reward independent of who she is, anonymity
holds.
Bounded market subsidy: If the event occurs, and there are n agents in the mech-
anism, then at worst every agent would have reported 1, and each would receive
a reward of 1 with probability 14n , meaning that in expectation the total reward
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given out is n · 14n . (The case if the event does not occur is similar.) In either
case, the highest expected reward given out would be n · 14n <
1
4 for n ) 1.
Myopically strategy proof: This follows from the fact that each (myopic) agent is
playing an independent Allen sweepstake with generalized sweepstake functions.
Sybilproof: In this setting, we will use the “full” definition of sybilproofness, i.e.,
an agent is no worse o" reporting once than consecutively reporting more than
once. With a slight abuse of notation, we want to show that
(5.3) EV (-(reporting once)) ) EV (-(reporting k times)), k ) 1.
Consider an agent with true belief p. Let us define
P̄ (r) = p(1" (1" r)2) + (1" p)(1" r2)
(P̄ (r) can be interpreted as this agent’s estimate, based on her beliefs, of the
probability of winning the sweepstake if she were the only trader in the mecha-
nism and reported value r). Then, when there are n traders in the mechanism
and this agent reports only once (in which case she would report her true belief,
r = p), her expected value of payo" is
EV (-(reporting once)) =
1
4n
P̄ (p) V (1).
Consider now the case when, by creating sybils, this agent makes k > 1 (possibly
di"erent) consecutive reports, and thus increasing the number of trades in the
mechanism to n + k " 1. Due to monotonicity of V (·), it can be argued that
to maximize her expected value, the agent should still have each of the sybils
report her true belief (since, by reporting r = p, each sybil plays in a sweepstake
the agent believes it has the highest chance of winning). Taking into account
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V (0) = 0, the expectation of the value received by the agent from sweepstakes
of k sybils is



































P̄ (p) V (1)
! 1
4n
P̄ (p) V (1).
The first inequality holds because V (·) is concave and V (0) = 0, implying that
V (i) ! iV (1) for i ) 1.
We conclude that for k ) 1, EV (-(reporting once)) ) EV (-(reporting k times)).
The mechanism above possesses all of the desirable properties outlined in Sec-
tion 5.2; however, the mechanism distributes rewards that are exponentially de-
creasing with the number of agents. Moreover, we know that if every agent makes
an equally informative report, then the expected normalized reward also decreases
exponentially with the number of reports. In the next section we will show that
expected normalized reward must decrease exponentially, in the worst case over all
information structures, whenever agents with unknown risk aversion are allowed to
participate in a mechanism with the properties of Section 5.2.
5.4 Impossibility Result
In this section, we show that if agents with arbitrary risk averse preferences are
allowed to participate in a mechanism of this class, then the normalized expected
reward of the agents must, on at least one family of information structures, decrease
exponentially with the number of agents.
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An overview of our proof is as follows: We first show that if agents of arbitrary
risk averse preferences participate in the mechanism, and the mechanism satisfies the
individual rationality condition included in the definition of myopic strategyproof-
ness, then the amount of reward given for any report must be non-negative. We then
consider a situation with n traders who each trade once, honestly revealing their
posterior probabilities. From this situation we identify a sybil attack with the same
n agents, i.e., the agents having the same posterior probabilities, making a total
of n + 1 reports, meaning that two of these reports are made by the same agent.
Using the sybilproofness property, if follows that the expected reward of the agent
making the two reports cannot be greater than her expected reward of making only
one report. We then construct a di"erent information structure with n + 1 agents
making the same n + 1 reports made in the sybil attack setting, however the reports
are truthful. We will then show that the expected rewards in the setting with n + 1
agents are bounded by a constant multiple of the expected rewards in the sybil at-
tack setting. Because the expected reward of the agent reporting twice in the “sybil
setting” is bounded by her expected reward in the “honest setting” with n agents,
it means that the expected reward of one of the agents in the setting with n + 1
agents is bounded by the expected reward of one of the agents in the setting with
n agents. We use this construction inductively, to show that the expected rewards
must be exponentially decreasing in n, even if all traders are trading honestly.
5.4.1 Sybil Attack Payo" Bound
Before we show our main result, we first show that the reward in any mechanism
satisfying the properties in Section 5.2 must be non-negative. We also show that the
expected reward an agent receives for making the same report under di"erent beliefs
is bounded when the beliefs are bounded away from 0 and 1.
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Lemma V.1. If a mechanism satisfies the properties in Section 5.2 and allows all
rational agents with arbitrary risk averse types to trade, then each agent receives
non-negative reward for any report.
Proof. Consider a mechanism that has the potential to distribute negative rewards.
Now, consider an agent that receives a value of x for any payo" less than . for some





x x < .
. x ) .
. Consider the reward distribution that is given to this agent if
she trades honestly. By the myopic strategyproofness property, this agent’s expected
value from the rewards given to her must be non-negative. Given her value function,
if any reward were negative, a small enough . could be found such that the expected
reward is negative.
For ease of analysis, we will use the following approximation of relative entropy:
(5.4) ,p, q % [0.3, 0.7] 2(p" q)2 ! D(p||q) ! 5(p" q)2.
The left-hand inequality was proven by Okamoto [60]. The right-hand inequality
follows, for p, q % [0.3, 0.7], from the inequalities of log(1+x) ! x and log(1"x) ! "x.
We make this approximation because we can now approximate the informativeness
of a report (move) as the square of the di"erence between the posteriors after every
report (move). Moreover, a constant factor will not impact the exponential decrease
in the expected normalized reward of the report we are establishing.
Note that a mechanism cannot “tell” if it is faced with n agents trading honestly,
or a sybil attack with n " 1 agents with one trading twice consecutively. The only
di"erence between these two situations is in the beliefs of the agents; in the sybil
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attack, the market prices after a sequence of moves may not match the posterior
probability of the last trader. As all posterior probabilities are in a bounded range,
we show that this has limited e"ect:
Lemma V.2. For -1, -0 non-negative (with at least one of them positive), p, q %




















The proof follows from the observation that "p+*o"q+*0 is monotone decreasing if p < q
and monotone increasing if p > q in # > 0, with an asymptote at 1.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume -1 ) -0.




which satisfies the inequalities trivially.
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The first inequality holds by the definition of p, q, p̄, q̄. The remaining in-
equalities hold because p ) q and # is positive.











! #p + -0
#q + -0








This first three inequalities hold because p < q and # is positive. The fourth
inequality holds by the definition of p, q, p̄, q̄.
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Lemma V.2 states that the ratio between expectations over the same values with
respect to two di"erent probability mass functions is bounded by the ratio of the
elements in the probability mass functions. We use this idea to bound the expected
reward of the same report made in a mechanism under two di"erent beliefs.
Lemma V.3. An agent making a report ri after history µi under belief p(µi, si),
receives an expected reward that is a constant multiple of the expected reward she re-
ceives when making report ri after history µi under belief q(µi, si), where p(µi, si), q(µi, si) %

















The proof follows by applying lemma V.2 in the setting of non-negative rewards,
and using the fact the posteriors are bounded to (pl, pu) to get a bound for all
posteriors. In our setting we use pl = 0.497 and pu = 0.503.
Proof. By Lemma V.1 we know that the reward to any agent is non-negative. This
means that the expected reward for a risk neutral agent must also be non-negative,
and may be written as: p(µi, si)-(ri, µi, n,% = 1) + (1 " p(µi, si))-(ri, µi, n,% = 0)
in one setting, and q(µi, si)-(ri, µi, n,% = 1) + (1" q(µi, si))-(ri, µi, n,% = 0) in the
other.
The rewards are non-negative and p(µi, si), q(µi, si) % (pl, pu), (pl, pu) 0 (0, 1). We
















As both posteriors, p(µi, si) and q(µi, si), are bounded in some interval (pl, pu) 0








! max( plpu ,
p̄l
p̄u )
5.4.2 Inductive Construction of Information Structures
To reiterate, we define an information structure to be the set of all histories and all
honest reports with no sybils for all combinations of all the agents’ signal realizations.
This can be represented as a tree where each level represents an agent, each node
represents the belief, or market prediction, of an agent before her report is made,
and each branch represents the signal realizations that lead to the current market
prediction. (Note that, except for the first agent, each agent’s belief is a posterior
distribution, calculated based on observing the (honest) reports of the other agents
and inferring their signals from their reports.) Such a representation can be seen in
Figure 5.4. In Figure 5.4, there are 3 agents, each starting with a common prior on %
of 0.5. If the first agent sees a “right” signal, she makes an honest report of 0.5 + c2 ,
and all agents calculate their posterior. If the second agent sees a “left” signal, and
had a prior of 0.5 + c2 , she reports 0.5 +
c
4 , and so on.
We will now describe our inductive procedure to construct a family of informa-
tion structures I(n). Fix a mechanism in the class described in Section 5.2. The
construction of I(n) depends on the mechanism, but enables us to show that, for any
given mechanism, there is a family of information structures on which the mechanism
must exhibit exponentially decreasing normalized rewards. The inductive construc-
tion requires one additional parameter c, which bounds the agents’ posteriors. In
this chapter we use c = 0.003.
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We assume that each agent has a common prior of 0.5 on the outcome of the
event. Further, all agents’ posteriors are bounded between 0.5 " c and 0.5 + c. In
the constructed structures, the first j + 1 agents, with probability 12 , observe one
of two signals (e.g., right, left). The remaining agents observe their signals with
probabilities that make their beliefs consistent with their reports. How the value of
j is selected will be explained later in this section, and we will note that the actual
reports of agents after j + 1 do not influence the results.
The first structure, I(1), has only one agent. If the agent receives a right signal then
her posterior is 0.5+c, and if she receives a left signal then her posterior is 0.5"c. (In
Figure 5.1, we illustrate the information structure I(1); we say that the informative-
ness of the report in I(1) is (0.5+ c"0.5)2 = c2). We then create I(2) by splitting the
report in I(1) into two symmetric reports as illustrated in Figure 5.2. When we say a
report is split, we mean that an additional level is added to the binary tree represent-
ing the information structure. Further, the history up to the split report remains the
same and history after the split changes in order to make all reports consistent with
the joint probability distribution underlying the resulting information structure. We
say that a report is symmetric when for all signal realizations the absolute value of the
di"erences in the prior, before the report is made, and the posterior, after the report
is made, of that report are equal. For instance, in Figure 5.2, the first report is sym-
metric because |0.5"(0.5" c2)| = |0.5"(0.5+
c
2)|, and the second report is symmetric







Similarly, all of the reports in Figure 5.4 are symmetric, however the last report in
Figure 5.3 may or may not be symmetric, depending on the values of #1–#6.
Starting with I(3), we construct I(k+1) from I(k) by comparing the expected re-





























































































































Figure 5.2: n = 2
comparing two symmetric reports, because by construction we are always splitting a
report into two symmetric reports. Say, report j and report j + 1 are these reports.
For example, in I(2), j = 1. If the expected reward of agent j is 4 times greater
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than the expected reward of agent j + 1, then I(k+1) is created by splitting report
j into two symmetric reports (this case is exhibited when creating I(3) shown in
Figure 5.3 from I(2)). Assuming report j shifted the posterior by ±! (meaning for
one signal realization the di"erence in posteriors will be ! and in the other signal
realization the di"erence in posteriors will be "!), then these new reports will shift
the posterior by ±0.9!. Note that the report following the split in I(k+1) will become
asymmetric in order to make the beliefs consistent with the reports (the exact value
of this report does not matter because rewards are independent of future reports).
For I(k+1) constructed in this manner, we set jk+1 = j, where jk+1 is the first report
we consider for splitting in the next step of the inductive construction process.
Otherwise, i.e., if the expected reward of agent j in structure I(k) is not 4 times
greater than the expected reward of agent j + 1, then I(k+1) is created by splitting
report j + 1 into two symmetric reports (this case is exhibited when creating I(3)
shown in Figure 5.4 from I(2)). Assuming report j + 1 shifted the posterior by ±!,
then these new reports will shift the posterior by ±0.5!. For I(k+1) constructed in
this manner, we set jk+1 = j + 1; again, jk+1 is the first report we consider for
splitting next.
By the construction of I(k+1) we keep the history before the split report the same
as it was in I(k). Moreover, if we let jsk be the report split in I
(k), then we know that
jk+1 = jsk, where jk+1 is the first report we consider in I
(k+1). We note that so long
as the posterior before a report is between the posteriors after the report under two
di"erent signal realizations, we can always construct a feasible information structure
(i.e., an information structure that is consistent with Bayesian updating on some
joint distribution on si and %). By the construction of I(k+1) from I(k) we note
that the posteriors before a report are always bounded between the posteriors after,
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meaning the information structures we construct are feasible.
For example, in Figure 5.2 we show I(2) when there are two agents in the mech-




the second is ((0.5+ c)" (0.5+ c2))
2 = c
2
4 ) ; We show I
(3) in Figure 5.3 if report j = 1
was split, and in Figure 5.4 we show I(3) when report j = 2 was split.
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Figure 5.3: n = 3 case 1
5.4.3 Exponential Bound
The exponential bound that we show follows from the fact that we allow agents of
arbitrary risk averse preferences to participate in a mechanism satisfying the prop-
erties in Section 5.2.
Theorem V.4. If an anonymous, guaranteed liquidity mechanism satisfies properties
P1–P3, then, there is a family of information structures I(n), each parameterized
by a number n of agents, such that, if all agents perform perfect Bayesian updating
according to the structure I(n) and report their posteriors honestly, the minimum
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Figure 5.4: n = 3 case 2
normalized expected reward of an agent must decrease exponentially with n.
The proof follows inductively by building a family of information structures, where
one of the two last added reports is split into two new reports, to simulate a sybil
attack. The report split is determined by looking at the expected rewards of the two
new added reports. In one case the new reports have 0.81 times the informativeness
of the original report, and in the other the new reports have 0.25 times the infor-
mativeness. The sybilproofness property, specialized for a risk neutral agent, implies
that the expected reward from the original report must be greater than or equal to
the expected reward of the two new reports. Using the fact that the rewards are
non-negative and Lemma V.3, we show that one of the new reports, made in the
honest setting, has an expected normalized reward that is no more than c+0.50.5!c ·
80
81 the




81 < 1. Iteratively applying this observation, we can show that there exists at
least one trade that has an expected normalized reward exponentially smaller than
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the expected normalized reward of only participating in the mechanism in which
n = 1.
Proof. In the following we will be applying the sybilproofness property at every step,
while constructing a sequence of information structures I(n), n = 1, 2, . . . , where n
is the number of agents trading. During a sybil attack, a risk neutral agent would
be comparing the expected payo" she may receive for trading once to the expected
payo" she may receive when trading twice with the same information. In order for
the sybilproof property to hold, the expected payo" over her beliefs in information
structure I(n), from reporting once must be at least as large as the expected payo"
from reporting twice. We write this as:
(5.5)
E)%P{I(n)}-(rn, µn, n,%) ) E)%P{I(n)}[-(r#n, µn, n + 1, %) + -(r#n+1, µn+1, n + 1, %)].
Above we use E)%P{I(n)}[·] to note that the expectation of the reward is with respect
to the posteriors in I(n). In order to avoid adding unnecessary notation we use the
following convention to discern if we are considering a case of a sybil attack or a case
of a honest trade:
honest trade: E)%P{I(N)}[-(r
N











j+1, N + 1, %)].
The key di"erence here is that, in the sybil attack setting, the number of traders is
N , having beliefs defined in I(N), is not the same as the number of reports, N + 1,
the third value in the reward function. However, in the honest trade setting they are
both equal to N .
Below we present a proof by induction:
Inductive Hypothesis: There exists an information structure I(N) with a pair of
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j , µj, N,%) + -(r
N













c2 to be the expected normalized reward of an agent
reporting once in information structure I(1). In I(1) an agent starts with a prior of
0.5, with equal probability observes a value (right, left) of her private binary signal,
and reports 0.5 + c if she observes one value (right) or 0.5 " c if she observes the
other (left).
If we show (5.6) holds for all N , then we would have shown the result of the
theorem, as we would have constructed a family of information structures where
there exists at least one report that has a normalized expected reward exponentially
smaller than l. In particular, as all rewards are non-negative, it follows that all
expected rewards are also non-negative. This means:
E)%P{I(N)}-(r
N
j , µj, N,%) ! E)%P{I(N)}[-(rNj , µj, N,%) + -(rNj+1, µj+1, N,%)]






















Note that the last inequality gives us the desired exponential reduction for c ! 0.003.
Base case: For N = 2, we start with I(1) where only one agent is making a single
report with an initial prior of 0.5 and either reports 0.5 + c with probability 12 or
0.5"c with probability 12 . This agent now is considering making two reports with the
same prior she had in I(1). The two reports considered have equal informativeness
and are created by splitting the report in I(1) into two symmetric reports as depicted
in Figure 5.2. In order for the agent not to make these two reports via two sybils,
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the sybilproofness property must hold:
(5.7) E)%P{I(1)}-(r1, µ1, 1, %) ) E)%P{I(1)}[-(r#1, µ1, 2, %) + -(r#2, µ2, 2, %)].
Using Lemma V.3, we can compare E)%P{I(1)}[-(r
#
1, µ1, 2, %) + -(r
#
2, µ2, 2, %)] to
E)%P{I(2)}[-(r
#
1, µ1, 2, %) + -(r
#
2, µ2, 2, %)] as two agents make the same reports under
di"erent priors, noting that by construction both reports are contained in [0.5 "







1, µ1, 2, %)+-(r
#
2, µ2, 2, %)] ! E)%P{I(1)}[-(r#1, µ1, 2, %)+-(r#2, µ2, 2, %)].






2, and the informativeness of the only report is I(1) is c2. Note that by
the definition of tn, we can write t2 =
1
4c
2. We now examine the normalized expected
reward for the reports in I(2):
E)%P{I(2)}[-(r
#
1, µ1, 2, %) + -(r
#





Similarly, we calculate the normalized expected reward of the report in I(1) as:
E)%P{I(1)}-(r1, µ1, 1, %)
c2
.




1, µ1, 2, %) + -(r
#



















The last inequality follows from the definition of l. We can now multiply both sides
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The last inequality holds by the definition of t2. We now multiply both sides by t2
and 0.5+c0.5!c to get:
E)%P{I(2)}[-(r
#
1, µ1, 2, %) + -(r
#
2, µ2, 2, %)] !
0.5 + c
0.5" ct24l








We have just shown that (5.6) hold for N = 2, and will now look at the inductive
step.
Inductive Step: Assuming that the inductive hypothesis holds for N , will show
that it holds for N + 1 by constructing an appropriate information structure I(N+1)
that is derived from I(N). Recall that j and j + 1 are the two reports just created
in I(N). We will construct I(N+1) by setting I(N+1) = I(N+1
#) if the expected reward
of report j is greater than 4 times the expected reward of report j + 1, and we set
I(N+1) = I(N+1
##) otherwise. I(N+1
#) is defined by splitting report j in I(N) into two
symmetric reports, each with a di"erence in the posteriors before and after the report
of 0.9·
1
tN , and the reports after split will become asymmetric so that the beliefs can
remain consistent (note that the future reports do not matter as long as consistency
is preserved and the posteriors are bounded between 0.5 " c and 0.5 + c). I(N+1##)
is defined by splitting report j + 1 in I(N) into two symmetric reports, each with a
di"erence in the posteriors before and after the report of 12 ·
1
tN , with report j in
I(N+1
##) the same as report j in I(N). We will now show that (5.6) holds for I(N+1).
Consider the case I(N+1) = I(N+1
#). We know that by the sybilproofness property
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j+1, N + 1, %)] !
E)%P{I(N)}-(r
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j , µj, N,%) + -(r
N
j+1, µj+1, N,%)].
The last inequality holds by the conditions on the expected rewards of reports j and
j + 1 in I(N) that lead to I(N+1
























































The last inequality holds by the inductive hypothesis (5.6). We recall that the
informativeness of each the two new reports in I(N+1



















This last inequality holds by observing 8081 · 0.81 =
4
5 .
Consider now the case I(N+1) = I(N+1











j+1, N + 1, %)] !
E)%P{I(N)}-(r
N













j , µj, N,%) + -(r
N
j+1, µj+1, N,%)].
The last inequality holds by the conditions on the expected rewards of reports j and
j + 1 in I(N) that lead to I(N+1
























































The last inequality holds by the inductive hypothesis (5.6). We note that the infor-
mativeness of each the two new reports in I(N+1
##) is 0.25tN , i.e., tN+1 = 0.25tN in
I(N+1



















The last inequality holds by observing 15 !
80
81 · 0.25.
Note that in either case the inductive hypothesis holds, meaning that the expo-
nential decrease is preserved.
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5.5 Discussion and Future Work
In this chapter we present one mechanism that satisfies the desirable properties
of subsidized prediction markets that allows agents with unknown risk averse value
functions to participate. However, this mechanism requires that the normalized ex-
pected rewards exponentially decrease with the number of agents. We then show that
as long as the risk aversion structure of the agents is not known, for any mechanism
in the class described in Section 5.2 that allows agents with arbitrary risk averse
value functions to participate, the normalized expected reward decreases exponen-
tially with the number of agents. This result may help in developing new forms of
prediction markets, that are guaranteed to converge to the truthful equilibrium even
in the presence of risk averse agents.
The presented result relies on the fact that agents can be highly risk averse,
leading to the observation that only non-negative rewards are given for any report.
This seems like a very restrictive setting, and thus considering a setting where the
amount of risk aversion is bounded, and that does not have the exponential decrease
in the normalized expected reward, is of interest. Moreover, the mechanism that
we presented satisfied all of the desired properties due to the fact that the expected
value of a reward is linear in the probabilities. In the future it would be interesting if
a mechanism satisfying the properties in Section 5.2 could be found where the agents
could be characterized by a more general decision model, such as prospect theory or
uncertainty aversion, that is not necessarily linear in the probabilities.
CHAPTER VI
Conclusion
In this dissertation we address issues in information management problems using
an algorithmic and economic perspective. In particular, we focus on the two topics
of information procurement and delivery by way of prediction markets and network
routing, respectively. To summarize, our contributions are:
• Devise robust routing policies that take into account demand fluctu-
ations and congestion control. We formulate mathematical models used to
generate routing policies that take into account active congestion control and
are robust to demand variation. Combining random early detection (RED),
multi-protocol label switching (MPLS), robust optimization, and non-linear pro-
gramming we show that routing policies that take into account natural demand
variation perform better than current routing policies. Though the resulting
model is NP-hard, we are able to show that solutions returned by modern non-
linear solvers outperform routing policies currently in use when congestion is
high.
• Show blu!ng can exist in prediction markets with non-myopic traders.
Devise prediction market mechanisms robust to non-myopic traders.
In prediction markets using market scoring rules we characterize the behavior of
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strategic traders with complementary information. We show that traders have
incentive to blu" and do not fully reveal their information. Further, we propose
the $-discounted market scoring rule to make the market robust to strategic
traders.
• Devise a prediction market mechanism that accurately aggregates the
information of risk averse traders. We show that any prediction mar-
ket that aggregates the beliefs of risk averse traders exponentially
decreases the reward as the number of participants increases. Current
prediction markets assume risk neutral traders. However, risk aversion is ex-
hibited by players in both real money and play money settings. We describe
the desirable properties that a prediction market satisfies. We propose a sweep-
stakes mechanism that satisfies all of these properties even in the presence of
risk averse traders. Our mechanism exponentially decreases rewards to agents
as the number of agents increases. We show that this characteristic is necessary
in any prediction market that accurately aggregates the beliefs of risk averse
traders
Future Work
In what follows, we present some future research directions in information pro-
curement and delivery:
• Design quick approximations to the NP-hard routing model account-
ing for congestion control. In Chapter II, we show the usefulness of the
designed routing policies as they outperform existing routing policies. However,
the model to generate the designed routing policies is NP-hard and requires
large amounts of computation with current non-linear programming solvers.
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Can we design fast approximation algorithms that achieve near-optimal solu-
tions and scale well with the size of the network?
• Design good routing heuristics, based on local knowledge instead of
global optimization. The models and results in Chapter II assume global
knowledge of the entire network and its demand in designing the routing policy.
In an evolving network, this information is not available. Therefore, finding a
good routing policy using only local information is of interest.
• Identify the information setting of traders in a prediction market
using their trading histories. In our analysis of non-myopic strategies in
prediction markets (Chapter IV), we note that Chen et al. [22] show a setting
where the myopic strategy is an equilibrium strategy. These two results are
extended by Chen et al. [20] to show non-myopic strategies are equilibrium
strategies when traders have complementary information and myopic strategies
are equilibrium strategies when traders have substitutable information. In the
future, identifying the relationship between traders’ information by their trading
history is of interest.
• Analysis of prediction markets on events with uncertain ending times.
In Chapter IV we introduce the discounted market scoring rule to alleviate the
issue of blu!ng in prediction markets. Discounting may be characterized as
traders being uncertain if they will come back to the market to trade again,
therefore, they are discounting their future expected payo"s. This uncertainty
naturally leads to the consideration of prediction markets on events with un-
certain ending times. Consider a project manager trying to decide which of
two unlikely long term projects to fund. If the success of each of these projects
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was traded on a current prediction market, their price would be very close to
zero, making them di!cult to di"erentiate. However, if these two projects were
represented as a claim with an uncertain ending time, “Will the first project
finish before the second project?”, the projects could be di"erentiated giving
the manager additional information. Such contingencies lead to new strategic
questions for traders. For example, if a trader knows that the first project will
be a success but is uncertain about the second project, they may not know when
to reveal their information. Characterizing trader behavior in this setting is of
interest for future prediction market design.
• Analyze the necessity of exponential reward decrease in prediction
markets with traders with bounded risk aversion. In Chapter V we
discuss the impact of risk averse traders in prediction markets. We use the fact
traders of arbitrary risk averse preferences may participate in a market to show
that the reward distributed in any mechanism must be non-negative. With the
non-negative reward requirement, we show that for any mechanism to satisfy 5
desirable properties the mechanism must exponentially reduce the distributed
reward as the number of traders increases. This leaves the open question of can
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